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ABSTRACT

Policies to change the way teachers are trained, licensed, and compensated constitute a major part of the educational reform agendas advanced by state governments over the past several years. These policies have been extremely difficult to implement, and state officials face the prospect that many of them will need substantial modification. This report argues that the explanation lies in a basic dilemma that most state teacher policies pose: the need to accommodate two different, yet equally legitimate, values--popular control and professionalism--in their design and implementation. This report examines the inherent tensions between democratic control and professionalism, how they are manifested in teacher policies, how they influence subsequent implementation, and how the two approaches might be more effectively balanced in future generations of teacher policy. The data analyzed represent over 600 interviews with state policymakers, interest group representatives, local district officials, principals, and classroom teachers in 19 local districts and 50 schools in the states of Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, and Pennsylvania. (64 references) (Author/MLF)

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The Dilemma of Teacher Policy

Lorraine M. McDonnell

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PREFACE

Over the past decade, a major part of the education policy debate has focused on finding ways to improve the size and quality of the teaching profession. The discussion often becomes stymied on the issue of who should govern the profession, establish its entry standards, and define the canons of sound practice. Most agree that the public, through its elected representatives, and the teaching profession itself both have a role to play in making such decisions. Yet policymakers have rarely been able to strike an effective balance between the two interests, and this failure has sometimes led to serious implementation difficulties and dashed expectations.

This report examines the relationship between norms of democratic control and professionalism in the design and implementation of policy, using recent teacher policies in five states as illustrative cases. It then attempts to identify ways that the two interests might be better accommodated in the future. It is addressed to policymakers, to advocates of greater teacher professionalism, and to teachers themselves.

SUMMARY

Policies to change the way teachers are trained, licensed, and compensated constitute a major part of the educational reform agendas advanced by state governments over the past several years. These policies have been extremely difficult to implement, and state officials face the prospect that many of them will need substantial modification. This report argues that the explanation lies in a basic dilemma that most state teacher policies pose: the need to accommodate two very different, yet equally legitimate, values—popular control and professionalism—in their design and implementation.

POPULAR CONTROL AND PROFESSIONALISM

Popular or democratic control requires that schools, as public institutions, be held accountable to the citizenry and its elected representatives. This form of accountability assumes that public officials have the right to impose on schools and those who work there a set of performance standards consistent with the norms and expectations of the larger community. Professionalism assumes that because the members of a particular profession possess a specialized body of knowledge and have been judged competent to practice that profession, they should be free to decide how best to serve their individual clients. In other words, accountability should be based on norms and standards collectively defined and enforced by peers. In their pure forms, these values each suggest different modes of governance and accountability for education.

In the extreme, the issues distinguishing democratic control and professionalism come down to a fundamental question of whether education is best controlled by lay decisions expressing majority preferences or by professional decisions based on practitioner knowledge and expertise. Subscribing entirely to either of these approaches makes policy design and implementation very difficult. The dilemma of democratic control is that politicians are not experts, nor are they responsible to the individual clients of public services. Their constituencies are far broader and represent diverse interests. The dilemma of professional control is that in responding to an authority outside the direct reach of either clients or the public at large, practitioners may misperceive the interests of both groups. The major challenge for policymakers, then, is how to balance these two values in the best interests of students. How should policies governing the training, certification, evaluation,

and compensation of teachers be designed, in light of the public's democratic claim and the profession's expert claim to know what is best for students?

STUDY PURPOSE AND DATA

This report examines the inherent tensions between democratic control and professionalism, how they are manifested in teacher policies, how they influence subsequent implementation, and how the two approaches might be more effectively balanced in future generations of teacher policy. It is based on field interview data collected between May 1986 and June 1987 in 19 local districts and 50 schools in five states—Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, and Pennsylvania. The data represent over 600 interviews with state policymakers, interest group representatives, local district officials, principals, and classroom teachers. The teacher policies enacted in these five states between 1983 and 1986 included a demonstration career ladder (Arizona); a mentor teacher program, increased minimum starting salary, and alternative training program for noncredentialed, beginning teachers (California); a master teacher program, later replaced by a school incentive program (Florida); stiffer recertification requirements and a market-sensitive minimum salary (Georgia); and increased requirements for teacher certification, induction, and continuing professional development (Pennsylvania).

TEACHER POLICY IN FIVE STATES

On balance, across the five states, attention to democratic control received greater emphasis than professionalism in the enactment of recent teacher policies. Performance standards were often defined through the political process, with limited input from teachers or the organizations representing them. Implicit in this emphasis was a belief that teacher quality had diminished and no longer met the electorate's performance expectations for a public institution. Therefore, rather than allowing the teaching profession to rejuvenate itself from within, state officials enacted policies requiring teachers to conform to performance criteria designed by public agencies and private test developers. State officials assumed that this approach respresented standards the electorate would view as legitimate, and that it would convince the public that policymakers were taking active responsibility for the schools.

At the same time, state policy agendas also had the goal of strengthening teaching as a profession. Policymakers recognized the need to make teaching a more attractive occupation and enacted mechanisms such as career ladders and mentor teacher programs. In requiring local districts to involve teachers in the design and operation of these programs, they also acknowledged the legitimacy of professional self-determination. However, even where such programs existed, policymakers required a form of accountability (linking student achievement with assessments of teacher performance) that was at odds with professional judgments about good teaching practice.

Concentration on policies that originate and are managed some distance from individual schools and classrooms, at the expense of professional self-governance, has also resulted in expectations for some programs that state and local agencies have lacked the capacity to fulfill. This is particularly true of the evaluation procedures for the career ladder in Arizona, the master teacher program in Florida, and certification testing in Georgia. These programs assumed not only that teachers had the ability to meet the policies' requirements, but also that those monitoring their performance could measure it reliably without either incurring undue costs or distorting classroom practice. States are now addressing this problem by, for example, decentralizing data collection (e.g., in Florida's merit school program) or investing in more research and development (as, for example, Georgia has agreed to do). Still, the inablility to measure teacher performance reliably and to collect relevant data cost-efficiently remains one of the most serious problems associated with teacher policies. In fact, the greatest obstacle to states in their struggle to balance democractic control and professionalism may well be the inability to resolve the questions of who should evaluate teachers and how they should be evaluated.

At the other end of the continuum are policies, such as the mentor teacher program in California, that make few demands on local district capacity and embody a minimal concern with external accountability. This approach is likely to make a policy easier to implement and it encourages greater professional autonomy, but the tradeoff may be that the goals of the larger system are sidelined. In establishing the mentor program, state policymakers saw themselves addressing a generic problem of needing to provide teachers with greater status and more support. However, the problem was never particularly well-defined, notions of professionalism were vague, and few accountability mechanisms were included. The result was a program that generated benefits largely limited to the mentor teachers themselves, unless a district was willing to shape it to meet a critical local need. The absence of state direction gave districts the flexibility to do this, but if districts chose not to do so, the program's impact would be quite limited.

RESOLVING THE DILEMMA: NEXT STEPS

The teacher policies analyzed in this report are now characterized as the "first wave" of educational reform. As their shortcomings have become more evident, reform advocates have proposed a second generation of policies that emphasize teacher professionalism—high entry standards established and implemented by the profession itself; greater teacher collegiality and autonomy within individual schools; and a differentiated staffing structure giving some teachers expanded leadership responsibilities. At the same time, demands for greater external accountability are also growing. The effort to provide policymakers and the public with more statistical information about how schools are performing, and then to reward, punish, and assist schools based on that information, has gained increased visibility over the past few years. Thus, the need to accommodate both democratic control and professionalism continues for the second generation of reform proposals.

The experience of state governments in designing and implementing teacher policies is instructive for identifying strategies that might strike a more effective balance between democratic control and professionalism in future policy design. Three are suggested in this report:

1. Concentrate on the areas of greatest agreement.
2. Expand the range of policy instruments.
3. Address the bureaucracy problem.

Concentrate on the Areas of Greatest Agreement

The first, and clearest, strategy for balancing the two approaches is to concentrate on the areas where advocates of the two viewpoints show the greatest agreement. The findings from this study and a variety of other investigations strongly suggest that a widespread consensus exists in favor of higher entry standards for teachers. Although it is less strong and less well-specified, a consensus is also growing around greater differentiation of teaching tasks and responsibilities in combination with some form of performance-based compensation—though not necessarily of the kind currently operating. Because teacher opininon data show considerably less consensus about the form that increased teacher participation in school decisionmaking should take and because the political and administrative feasiblity of the various options is largely unknown at this point, such policies should probably be accorded less immediate priority and should continue as diverse, small-scale experiments.

Expand the Range of Policy Instruments

Policymakers should also consider a broader range of strategies in designing future teacher policies. The "first-wave" policies were based on a rather narrow range of policy instruments. Mandates were used to ensure that minimum standards were met (e.g., testing for initial certification). In states where the policy problem was viewed as the need to stimulate teacher performance beyond some specified minimum, a variety of inducements were used (e.g., additional compensation, differentiated responsibilities and status).

However, if teacher policy is to strike a more effective balance between democratic control and professionalism, policymakers must consider expanding the range of strategies beyond mandates and inducements. One finding from the present analysis of recent teacher policies is particularly clear: Insufficient capacity is a primary reason for the failure of these policies to work as intended. State agencies, local districts, schools, and individual teachers currently lack the tools to ensure professional-level entry standards, to evaluate practicing teachers fairly and validly, or to reorganize teachers' responsibilties in more meaningful ways. If professionalism is to be strengthened without sacrificing democratic-control norms, states will have to fund a variety of capacity-building instruments that have been largely ignored. These include investment in better measures of teacher performance (for both new and experienced teachers) and, equally important, greater attention to professional development, so that teachers can engage in constructive peer review and work collaboratively with fellow professionals.

Address the Bureaucracy Problem

Whether future teacher policies favor professionalism or democratic control or are able to balance the two, they will be implemented through some type of bureaucracy. Given that some large states have over 100,000 teachers and that even moderate-sized school districts employ several thousand teachers each, teacher policy can only be implemented through organizations with a systematic division of labor, uniform rules of procedure, and some element of hierarchy. Even if policymakers were to delegate complete control of teaching to the profession itself, the sheer size and complexity of the enterprise would require that professional control be implemented through some type of bureaucratic organization.

Somewhat ironically, those advocating greater professionalism and those seeking to promote democratic control have both traditionally

viewed bureaucracy as a potential threat to fulfilling their objectives, and each group tends to blame the other for the growth of bureaucracy. This is particularly true of those advocating greater teacher professionalism. In their view, the governance of teaching through public policy is synonymous with bureaucratic control, which they contrast with professional control and define as its opposite.

Such a distinction confuses means and ends. Democratic control and professionalism are both legitimate values (or ends) that American society esteems and that teacher policy should seek to promote. Bureaucracy is the *means* that must be used in a complex world to implement policies advancing either or both of those goals. Therefore, the challenge for future teacher policy is not to eliminate bureaucracy, but to shape its structure and activities so that it is accountable both to the teaching profession and to the public. This challenge is easier to pose than to meet. One of the most difficult, continuing responsibilities of democratic government is that of holding its institutions accountable to those they serve. This goal will never be fully realized. But in the case of teacher policy, acknowledging that democratic control and professionalism are both legitimate goals that can be balanced through careful policy design and implementation is a critical first step.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report grew out of long discussions with Linda Darling-Hammond about the impasse that seems to have developed between elected officials and those advocating greater teacher professionalism. One of us sees the question largely from the perspective of a researcher seeking to improve the quality of teachers' professional lives, and the other, from the viewpoint of a political scientist concerned about democratic accountability. But we each accept the legitimacy of both norms, and we are both looking for ways in which they can be accommodated in policy design and professional practice. I am grateful to Linda for her insights and for helping me confront both sides of a very difficult question.

The field data on educational reform policy collected by the staff of the Center for Policy Research in Education were an invaluable resource for this study. These data were collected by Douglas Archbald, William Clune, Janice Patterson, Jessica Trubeck, and Patricia Williams at the University of Wisconsin-Madison; Susan Fuhrman, Beverly Hetrick, Craig Richards, and Mwalimu Shujaa at Rutgers University; Richard Elmore at Michigan State University; Lawrence Picus and Priscilla Wohlstetter, now at the University of Southern California; and Barnett Berry at the University of South Carolina.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Since 1980, virtually every state has enacted policies to change the ways teachers are trained, licensed, and compensated. More than 1,000 pieces of legislation have been developed, and a substantial fraction have been implemented (Darling-Hammond and Berry, 1988). Many of these policy initiatives have taken state governments into uncharted terrain, as legislatures and state departments of education have begun to exert more control over areas previously left to the discretion of colleges of education and school districts. Decisions about who will be admitted to teacher preparation programs, how they will be trained and licensed, and how they will be inducted, evaluated, and compensated are now the joint province of state and local policymakers.

This new interest of state policymakers in shaping the teaching occupation represents a decided shift in the theory of educational reform. Earlier efforts to improve schools focused on curriculum reform, the creation of new programs for students with special needs, and the prescription of student standards for coursetaking, promotion, and graduation. These initiatives sought to shape educational inputs and processes, on the theory that greater specification would improve the quality of schooling by making educational outcomes less dependent on the particular individuals delivering instructional services.

Yet policymakers also recognize the critical role that teachers play in student achievement. This acknowledgment, coupled with the decline in the supply and perceived quality of prospective teachers, has led to an alternative theory of educational reform which posits that enhancing the quality of the teaching force will improve educational quality. This perspective focuses as much on the human capital available in schools as on the programmatic infrastructure and assumes that teaching is a complex activity requiring knowledge and skill beyond the application of instructional formulas. The goal of policies based on this perspective is to expand the capacity of schools to meet student needs by improving the quality of teachers themselves. However, with the tools currently available to state policymakers, accomplishing that objective poses a major challenge.

This state approach to managing schooling is a recent development,[1] and given the uncertainty of the technology for defining and

[1]State efforts to influence teacher quality are not new—states have long regulated the licensing of teachers, and most specify requirements for state approval of teacher education programs. Some states, particularly in the South, have long had state teacher salary

influencing teacher quality and the complex governance questions raised, it is not surprising that policymakers have encountered significant difficulties in implementing teacher policies. Although many of those policies will undoubtedly need substantial modification, this area continues as a target of increased policy activity and the focus of far-reaching proposals for change (e.g., the Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy, 1986). What is not entirely clear is why the new teacher policies have generated so many problems.

This report argues that the explanation lies in the basic dilemma posed by most state teacher policies. It is the necessity to accommodate two very different, yet equally legitimate, values: popular control[2] and professionalism. Popular or democratic control requires that schools, as public institutions, be held accountable to the citizenry and its elected representatives. Under this form of accountability, public officials have the right to impose on schools and those who work there a set of performance standards consistent with the norms and expectations of the larger community. Professionalism assumes that because the members of a particular profession possess a specialized body of knowledge and have been judged competent to practice that profession, they should be free to decide how best to serve their clients. Under this philosophy, accountability is based on norms and standards defined by peers and is collectively enforced by members of the profession. In their pure forms, then, these approaches each suggest different modes of governance and accountability for education.

STUDY PURPOSE

This study examines the implementation of a variety of policies enacted in five states between 1983 and 1986 to change the ways teachers are trained, licensed, and compensated. It focuses on three issues:

- Why state policymakers enacted different types of teacher policies and what they expected them to accomplish.
- How these policies have been implemented in local schools and districts.
- What the short-term effects of the policies have been.

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schedules. Recent reforms, though, are more far-reaching in their scope and in the extent of state involvement, and they are occurring after a period of at least twenty years of relative inactivity in this area.

[2]Throughout this report, the words "popular control" and "democratic control" are used interchangeably to refer to the control of governmental institutions by officials who are regularly held accountable through the electoral process.

This study is guided by an analytical framework that focuses on the interaction between the local implementing context and policy design variables, such as how a policy problem is defined, the policy instruments selected, and available financial and technical resources. It finds that a number of different factors contribute to the difficulty of implementing new teacher policies. It also concludes that one factor—the inability of states and local districts to economically collect reliable and valid data on teacher performance—is particularly significant in explaining implementation outcomes.

But this is not a traditional implementation study. Although it is informed by an analytical framework derived from implementation research, it concentrates most of its attention on a single factor—the inherent tensions between democratic control and professionalism—and examines how they are manifested in teacher policies and how they influence subsequent implementation.

Democratic control and professionalism lie in the realm of political theory and are not typical variables in implementation studies. Nevertheless, this emphasis is appropriate for several reasons. First, even when critical factors such as the nature of the policy instrument, resource levels, and the amount of local discretion allowed by a policy are taken into consideration, it is very difficult to explain why various teacher policies have followed similar courses across very different political and organizational contexts. An examination of the ideas shaping the design of recent teacher policies led to a focus on the competing demands of advocates of democratic control and professionalism. Sometimes the interests embodied within these two approaches have been consistent, but often they suggest contradictory policy goals and strategies. Consequently, understanding the extent to which these differences have been reconciled in the design of teacher policies and the manner in which this was done helps to explain implementation outcomes and intermediate effects.

Second, the tension between democratic control and professionalism is a perspective that has been missing from political debate and scholarly research on teacher policy. Yet it is a potentially productive viewpoint for understanding the challenges inherent in crafting effective teacher policy, and it could serve as a vehicle for moving beyond the impasse that often develops around this issue. Finally, because the implementation of recent teacher policies has foundered on disputes involving the interplay between democratic control and professionalism, it is logical that future policy can be more effectively crafted if state officials consciously seek to accommodate both sets of interests. Both are, after all, legitimate, and slighting either in the design of new policy will exacerbate normal implementation problems.

This report analyzes the implementation of recent state teacher policies and also presents an alternative perspective on the policy debate, by focusing on the fundamental values that underlie and energize the debate over efforts to strengthen the teaching profession. The remainder of this chapter describes the study's data and outlines the analytical framework guiding the implementation analysis.

STUDY DATA

The research is based on field interview data collected in 19 districts and 50 schools in five states by the research staff of the Center for Policy Research in Education (CPRE).[3] The five states (Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, and Pennsylvania) were selected because of variation in the comprehensiveness of the education reforms they have enacted over the past four years, and because they are regionally diverse; districts and schools were selected to provide a range of size, amount of change required by the reforms, and capacity to respond to new policies. The data include over 600 structured interviews with state policymakers, interest-group representatives, local district officials, principals, and classroom teachers. The interviews explored the reasons for enacting particular policies; the advantages and disadvantages perceived by those in different role positions; and the extent to which different policies have addressed state and local needs.[4]

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The analytical framework of the study is based on the notion of alternative policy instruments (McDonnell and Elmore, 1987; McDonnell, 1988). Past research has defined four generic classes of instruments, i.e., mechanisms that translate substantive policy goals into concrete actions:

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[3]These data were collected by researchers at RAND, Rutgers University, and the University of Wisconsin-Madison over two years as part of a large-scale study of the implementation and effects of a variety of of educational reform policies. Other projects, based on these data, focus on student standards, teacher unions and school reform, educational technology, and efforts to monitor educational progress.

[4]The data have been organized in a computerized database that allows analysts access to interview responses by state, district, school, respondent category, topic, or any combination of these. Responses can be further categorized by the use of a keyword system, enabling us to conduct a much more extensive and systematic analysis than is typically feasible with qualitative data.

- **Mandates**: Rules governing the action of individuals and agencies, intended to produce compliance.
- **Inducements**: The transfer of money in return for certain actions.
- **Capacity-building**: The transfer of money for the purpose of investment in material, intellectual, or human resources.
- **System-changing**: The transfer of official authority among individuals and agencies to alter the system by which public goods and services are delivered.

This framework is particularly appropriate for examining teacher policy because state policymakers can rely on a broad range of policy instruments to address nominally identical problems. For example, in attempting to remedy the declining quality of new teachers, state policymakers might impose competency tests for teacher candidates (a mandate); supplement the starting salary paid by local districts (an inducement); improve the state's teacher training institutions by changing the curriculum or recruiting better faculty (capacity-building); or create professional standards boards to determine how preparation and certification ought to be structured (system-changing). The single instrument or combination that policymakers select will depend on how they define the problem, the resources available to them, and the constraints they face.

Each category of instrument can be distinguished by the primary mechanism it uses to motivate policy action. Mandates are rules that require compliance, while inducements and capacity-building both use financial resources to produce something of value or to enhance performance. The major difference between the latter two instruments is the time frame: Inducements focus on immediate production, capacity-building on longer-term investment in the skill and ability of those responsible for governmental performance. The instrumentality embodied in system-changing is authority over who can perform the functions of government and how that authority is allocated. Mandates, inducements, and capacity-building operate within existing patterns of authority and responsibility; system-changing alters those patterns in some fundamental way. A system-changing policy such as a professional standards board may involve the imposition of rules or requirements on those wishing to be certified, but its primary characteristic is that it expands the authority the teaching profession can exert over entry standards.

This typology helps to frame analysis of the fundamental question of implementation research: To what extent has a particular policy been implemented and to what extent has it produced effects consistent with

policymakers' expectations? Unlike most approaches to implementation research, however, the policy-instruments framework specifies only a few variables as the most significant in explaining outcomes. To the degree that a disjuncture exists between policy and effects, the search for explanation is facilitated by focusing attention on a small number of possibilities; in this case:

- The relationship between the way policymakers define a particular policy problem and the instrument selected.
- Assumptions about policy targets and expected effects.
- The match between the policy instrument and the implementing context.

In the case of teacher policies, the most significant elements of the implementing context are the local teacher labor market, the role of teacher unions, local policy priorities, and fiscal capacity.[5]

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

Section II outlines the major theoretical assumptions underlying concepts of popular control and professionalism. Section III examines teacher policy from the state perspective and focuses on the factors shaping state officials' policy choices and assumptions about expected effects. Section IV analyzes local implementation of these policies and the extent to which they are meeting state and local expectations. Section V discusses the implications of these findings for resolving the tension between democratic and professional control in successive generations of teacher policy.

[5]Since this study was not designed as a test of the policy-instruments framework and uses it only as a way to structure the implementation analysis, the framework's major assumptions are not discussed here. For an outline of those assumptions, see McDonnell, 1988.

II. POPULAR CONTROL AND PROFESSIONALISM

CONTRASTING SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY AND INTEREST

Popular control rests on the belief that the legitimacy of all governmental institutions derives from the consent of the electorate and that those institutions therefore must answer to them and their representatives. It presumes that the public will regularly hold legislators and executives accountable for the performance of public institutions such as schools (Dahl, 1982; Gruber, 1987). Democratic control further posits that a larger public interest transcends the interests and values of any single class of persons, and that its pursuit is best ensured if individual behavior is held accountable to the larger body politic. Consequently, it argues not only that public employees' behavior should be constrained, but that the constraints should be externally imposed. As Gruber (1987:12) argues:

> All behavior is in some way constrained, of course, whether by the values of an individual actor, by the resources the actor has available, or by formal limits on what may be done. What transforms constraint into democratic control is its imposition by a democratic political actor—either the citizens or their elected representatives. This may be done by citizens acting alone or in groups, by elected legislators or executives. It may be done negatively through sanctions against certain forms of action or positively through incentives to behave in specified ways. All that is essential . . . is that a mechanism impose constraint on bureaucratic behavior, that it be legal, and that the constraint be directly traceable to the citizenry.

This external constraint is typically operationalized through mechanisms such as elections, political action (e.g., lobbying), the exercise of judicial authority, or the imposition of performance standards on public sector institutions and their employees. All of these processes are predicated on the assumption that sufficient information about the quality of institutional performance will be publicly available to enable elected officials and citizens to make informed decisions.

Professionalism, on the other hand, assumes that members of an occupation possess a specialized body of knowledge and that, because their work poses complex and nonroutine problems, their application of that knowledge should be regulated by a code of ethics internal to the profession and by the voluntary groups representing it (Barber, 1965).

In this view, the application of professional knowledge to individual clients' needs requires judgment, so it cannot be reduced to rules or prescriptions for practice; thus professionals require autonomy from administrative control in determining tasks and functions (Boreham, 1983). In other words, teachers should be held accountable through standards and procedures collectively specified and enforced by their peers, not by externally defined and enforced criteria. Professional values are assumed to be consistent with the community's interest, but the norms of professional autonomy and self-governance deny the community's claim to enforce that consistency.

The differing assumptions underlying democratic control and professionalism are sharpest on two dimensions: *interest* and *authority*. (These and other major differences between democratic control and professionalism are summarized in Table 1.) The primary interest or concern of professionals, particularly those working in service organizations such as schools, is presumed to be the welfare of clients (Blau and Scott, 1982). Democratic control, on the other hand, assumes a far wider range of interests. It argues that elected representatives should serve the public welfare, broadly defined. All theories of representation assume that elected officials will aggregate and balance their own conception of the public interest, the diverse interests of their local constituents, those of their political party, the broader state or national

Table 1

TWO APPROACHES TO GOVERNING PUBLIC EDUCATION

	Popular Control	Professional Control
Practitioners Are Accountable to	Electorate and its representatives	Professional norms, and through them, to clients and the public
Interests Served	Constituents Political parties Organized groups Public interest as defined by political ideology Personal	Client welfare as defined by professional norms and standards Personal
Basis of Authority	Consent of the governed	Expert knowledge and judgment
Implementing Mechanisms	Elections Executive and legislative policymaking Courts Public bureaucracies	Training and licensing Professional associations Teacher involvement in school budgetary, personnel, and curriculum decisions

interest, and the expert judgments and preferences of various professional groups (Pitkin, 1967). Democratic control further requires that institutions implementing policy and delivering public services reflect the public interest as it has been articulated through the political process.

Professionalism and democratic control also differ in their sources of authority or legitimacy. Those acting on the basis of professionalism derive their authority from their ability to apply expert knowledge and judgment in the service of clients. Those acting under the rubric of popular control derive their authority from electoral mandates or the tenet that in a democracy, the legitimacy of all government derives from the consent of the governed.

PROFESSIONALISM AND THE QUEST FOR GREATER PROFESSIONAL CONTROL

Professional control is a concept related to, though not entirely synonymous with, professionalism. Professionalism implies that those working in a particular occupation have sufficient autonomy to decide how best to work within the norms and standards of that profession. The profession itself need not control all the terms of employment or the structure of service delivery, however; professionalism can exist within organizations where broad policies are established outside the profession itself (e.g., lawyers working for large corporations, university professors). In these cases, those in authority delegate to professionals discretion over their relationship with clients, but not direct control over the organization's resources. Professional control becomes an issue if the scope of delegation narrows significantly, in which case external authority might be seen as interfering with the ability of professionals to make independent decisions about practice.[1] In the case of public education, the call for greater professional control, and not just strengthened professionalism, has increased as state and local policies have extended to regulating what is taught in the classroom and how it should be taught.

[1]This example illustrates why the traditional politics-administration dichotomy (e.g., Wilson, 1887; Gulick, 1937), which assumes that democratic processes will identify goals and professional judgment will select the means, rarely holds up in practice. Professionalism and democratic control each specify a system for determining both ends and means, and in those cases where they articulate very different goals and methods for achieving them (e.g., serving the individual client vs. meeting the divergent needs of the larger community), a division of labor between ends and means cannot be clearly established.

Two arguments are typically offered for granting more professional control to teachers. First, research demonstrates that effective teaching behaviors vary for students with different learning styles, at different stages in their cognitive and psychological development, and for different subject areas, types of learning, and instructional goals (Darling-Hammond, Wise, and Pease, 1983). Thus, teaching requires judgments concerning how to apply specialized knowledge in nonroutine circumstances. Standardized prescriptions for practice are inadequate to ensure success. Higher knowledge levels and flexibility in applying that knowledge effectively enhance teachers' sense of self-efficacy, which is also positively correlated with student achievement (Armor et al., 1976; Ashton, Webb, and Dodo, 1982). Professional accountability—through more rigorous entry standards that ensure acquisition of professional knowledge, and peer review that ensures its use—will, in this view, provide an effective alternative to political accountability.

Second, those concerned with improving the recruitment and retention of competent teachers have argued that if teachers are granted more control over their work, teaching will be better able to attract and retain capable people, thus improving the quality of public schooling (e.g., Carnegie Forum, 1986; Darling-Hammond, 1984). This argument stresses the benefits of combining higher entry standards with better compensation and working conditions to make teaching more attractive to well-educated candidates. Both of these arguments assume that professional notions of autonomy and self-governance are consistent with the best interests of the broader community.

POPULAR CONTROL, PROFESSIONALISM, AND BUREAUCRACY

Despite their differences, advocates of professionalism and democratic control have one important characteristic in common: Both assume that bureaucracy stands as a potential threat to the fulfillment of their ultimate objectives and must be kept in check. Those espousing greater professionalism often counterpose its norms of collective autonomy and individual discretion against bureaucracy, with its assumptions of hierarchy and precisely specified rules (e.g., Friedson, 1973). They fear that unchecked bureaucracy will constrain the appropriate application of expert knowledge, diminish the quality of client services, and thereby undermine the whole structure of professional norms.

In a parallel way, democratic theorists and organizational analysts have stressed the essential differences between democratic control and bureaucracy:

> Bureaucracy and democracy are two fundamentally different analytical types of social organization. A bureaucracy is an organization established for the explicit purpose of achieving specific objectives, and the organizing principle is administrative efficiency, that is, an orientation to the expeditious attainment of the given objectives. A democracy is an organization established to ascertain the common objectives among men on the basis of the will of the majority or their representatives, and the organizing principle is the freedom of dissent necessary for majority opinions to form (Blau, 1963: 264).

While they acknowledge that bureaucracy is necessary to the efficient functioning of democratic institutions in a large, complex society, political and organizational theorists have focused on mechanisms for controlling bureaucratic power so that its exercise is consistent with democratic norms (e.g., Hyneman, 1950; Friedrich, 1940; Finer, 1941; Yates, 1982). Their concern stems from a fear that unchecked bureaucratic power can undermine the very basis of democracy:

> Controlling bureaucracies . . . takes on special urgency in democracies because unaccountable power flies in the face of the central norms of such political systems. When the legitimacy of a government derives from the consent of the governed, the problem becomes not merely an inability to get the governmental apparatus to act in ways the leaders or citizens wish but also a challenge to the fundamental nature of that government (Gruber, 1987:5).

The irony is that those advocating greater professionalism see policies enacted by elected officials to ensure greater public accountability as a major cause of unproductive bureaucratization (e.g., Wise, 1979), while those concerned about preserving democratic control see teachers as bureaucrats with professional values that often make them unresponsive to citizen preferences (e.g., Yates, 1982; Yin and Yates, 1975; Gruber, 1987). In effect, those advocating one approach see the other as a major cause of the negative effects commonly associated with bureaucracy. Yet both professionalism and popular control norms are likely to be implemented through bureaucracies. The issue is, to whom should these institutions be held accountable?

BALANCING POPULAR CONTROL AND PROFESSIONALISM IN PUBLIC EDUCATION

In the extreme, the basic issue distinguishing professionalism and democratic control is the fundamental question of whether education is best controlled by lay decisions expressing majority preferences or by professional decisions based on experience and expertise. Yet subscribing to either of these viewpoints in its pure form makes policy design and implementation very difficult. The dilemma of democratic control is that politicians are not experts, nor are they responsible to the individual clients of public services; their constituencies are broad and represent diverse interests. The dilemma of professional control is that in responding to an authority outside the direct reach of either clients or the public at large, practitioners may misperceive the interests of both groups. The debate is a long-standing one. As Cremin (1965) notes:

> There is a tension here, of course, that has been at the heart of the popular education system from the very beginning. On the one hand, there is the prerogative of the public to set policy, determine direction, and fix support: we speak of public control, not merely public sponsorship or public influence. On the other hand, there is the prerogative of the teaching profession to govern its own work, set standards, and determine the nature of teaching practice: the teacher is committed to teaching truth as he sees it and to following truth wherever it leads (90–91).

Popular control and professionalism are strongly held values with deep historical and philosophical roots. Both presume a causal process. Democratic control, in the present case, assumes that good outcomes will result for all participants in the educational process (i.e., students and the larger community) if policymakers hold teachers accountable to standards that reflect community expectations and meet basic due-process criteria, and if the policymakers are held accountable to the public through regular popular elections. Professionalism assumes that autonomy and self-governance will attract competent people, keep incompetents out, encourage better teaching tailored to the unique needs of students, and thus result in improved learning. Yet even if it could be validly measured, the relationship between educational practices that maximize either of these philosophies and actual student learning is an indirect one, at best.

It is also clear that either viewpoint can be used to rationalize practices that are detrimental to the interests of an individual, a group, or the general public. For example, the majoritarian popular control of

schools has been used as a powerful argument against school desegregation (Hochschild, 1984). Similarly, professional expertise has sometimes been used as a shield by practitioners to avoid grappling with policy changes supported by the broader public (Gruber, 1987; Elmore and McLaughlin, 1988). Furthermore, neither democratic "knowledge" of what is best for local schools and communities nor professional knowledge of what is best for individual students can be applied with certainty in all cases. It is necessary also to contend with a third party who is relatively powerless in the educational accountability equation—the student, who is obliged by law to attend school and whose interests may not be served by either political accountability mechanisms or professional accountability standards.

Consequently, the major dilemma for policymakers is how to balance these two approaches in the best interests of students. How should policies governing the training, certification, evaluation, and compensation of teachers be designed, in light of the public's democratic claim and the profession's expert claim to know what is best for students? The task is not easy, and it raises a host of normative and practical issues. For example, those advocating greater professionalism for teachers cite the educational research literature, arguing that students will learn more effectively if individual schools are granted more autonomy to diagnose and solve problems, and if teachers and principals have greater flexiblity to exercise their professional judgment (e.g., Goodlad, 1984; Carnegie Forum, 1986). Yet individual schools cannot be held directly accountable through the electoral process. And while other forms of accountability (e.g., creating a quasi-market mechanism through greater parental choice) may resolve part of the dilemma, they present still another set of limitations and tradeoffs. The essential mechanism of democratic control—elections to select who governs states and school districts—is an indirect and often uncertain vehicle for making local schools more responsive to the immediate needs of the students they serve, and efforts to increase top-down accountability can become unwieldy and costly.

Even if the normative issue of how much weight should be accorded each type of control could be resolved, a host of practical issues arise. For example, how do policymakers monitor teacher performance without creating perverse or unintended consequences (e.g., encouraging a single model of teaching that may be inappropriate for some teachers and students, lowering teacher morale, incurring high costs to ensure that the monitoring process is fair and reliable)? How can the uniformity needed to guarantee equal access to good teaching for all students be balanced with the flexibility required to meet the diverse needs of local communities and individual students? How can

policymakers encourage teachers to exercise their professional judgment without generating a kind of paternalism that ignores the wishes of the electorate (Thompson, 1987) or shields self-interest from checks and balances?

As discussed in Sec. III, state policymakers have confronted these normative and practical problems over the past several years as they have tried to craft policies to strengthen the teaching profession.

III. TEACHER POLICY IN FIVE STATES[1]

At first glance, dissimilarities in political culture, size, fiscal capacity, and educational organization suggested that the five sample states' choices of teacher policies and their experience in implementing those policies would be significantly different. For example, Florida, with a tradition of state activism in education policy, stands in sharp contrast to Arizona and Pennsylvania, where the political culture supports only a very limited role for state government. The five states also vary considerably in the size of their elementary and secondary education systems. California has 4.5 million students; Florida, almost 2 million; Georgia and Pennsylvania, over a million each; and Arizona, about 600,000. The number of local school districts with which the state government must deal ranges from only 67 in Florida to over 1,000 in California. Of the five states, only Florida raised taxes to fund its educational reforms of the 1980s; state spending for schools increased by about 5 percent the first year. Georgia and California were able to fund their reforms out of economic growth; Georgia increased school spending by over 13 percent the first year, and California increased it by about 10 percent. In Arizona, reform policies added about 3 percent to state funding for education, and in Pennsylvania, they added about 1 percent. Because of industrial downturns, the latter two states had less fiscal slack with which to work.[2]

[1]This section is based on interviews conducted in the five states during the spring of 1986. Research staff from RAND, Rutgers, and the University of Wisconsin-Madison interviewed approximately 150 state-level respondents, including governors' education aides, state legislators and their staffs, state board of education members, state department of education officials, and interest-group representatives. Other articles, reports, and papers have also used these same data to examine the enactment of educational reforms in the five states (Fuhrman, Clune, and Elmore, 1988; McDonnell, 1987), the implementation of new student standards (Clune, White, and Patterson, 1989), and the role of teacher unions in educational reform (McDonnell and Pascal, 1988).

[2]Consistent with differences in size and fiscal context, the five states also differ in number of teachers and average salary paid them. For example, California has more than six times as many teachers as its neighboring state, Arizona. The 1987-88 estimated numbers of classroom teachers and the average teacher salaries for the five states were:

State	Total Number of Classroom Teachers	Average Teacher Salary ($/yr)
Arizona	31,911	27,388
California	196,524	33,092
Florida	95,857	25,382
Georgia	59,415	26,177
Pennsylvania	102,900	28,961

SOURCE: National Education Association (NEA), 1988.

Yet not only is there great variety among the teacher policies enacted by the five states between 1983 and 1986 (see Table 2), there is also striking similarity. Two states chose to focus only on the compensation aspects of teacher policy, while the others concentrated on several areas, including teacher training, certification, compensation, and professional development. But despite their varied emphases, four of the five states decided to stress teacher compensation and to rely on inducements to accomplish their purpose.

These five states represent a range of activity level and choice of policy strategies that is quite typical of state governments generally. For example, half of the 50 states implemented some type of teacher incentive program within the past few years (Gaines and Cornett, 1988); three of the five sample states did so. Half of the states have statewide minimum teacher salaries; two of the sample states do. By 1986, 46 states had mandated some type of test for teacher certification, in either basic skills, subject matter, or professional knowledge

Table 2

MAJOR TEACHER POLICIES IN FIVE STATES: 1983–1986

State	Policy	Type of Instrument
Arizona	Demonstration career ladder	Inducement
California	Mentor teacher program	Inducement
	Minimum starting salary	Inducement
	Alternative training program for non-credentialed beginning teachers	System-changing
	Stronger management prerogatives over teacher retention	Mandate
	Requirement for continuing professional development	Mandate
Florida	Merit pay and master teacher program (now replaced by a school incentive program)	Inducement
Georgia	Stiffer recertification requirements	Mandate
	Market-sensitive minimum salary	Inducement
Pennsylvania	Increased requirements for teacher certification, induction, and continuing professional development	Mandate

(Darling-Hammond and Berry, 1988); all five of the sample states had implemented such tests.[3]

In an earlier study (Elmore and McDonnell, 1987), we hypothesized that if policymakers perceive a policy problem as the need to achieve a specified minimum, they will be likely to choose a mandate approach. However, if they view the purpose as moving behavior beyond an expected minimum, they will be more likely to choose inducements. This type of reasoning is clearly evident in the states that focused on compensation policy. Arizona, California, Florida, and Georgia had, in the five years prior to 1983, imposed mandates in the form of teacher certification tests to ensure that certain minimum standards would be met. However, their second generation of teacher reform policies were intended to move beyond minimium standards and to attract and retain competent professionals. Consequently, in addition to the mandates imposed in prior years, these states also chose to use a variety of inducements. This pattern is consistent with what occurred in the country as a whole: States first used mandates to raise teacher standards, then subsequently concentrated on policies designed to make teaching a more attractive profession (Darling-Hammond and Berry, 1988).

Another striking similarity across the five states is their limited reliance on capacity-building instruments. Because public and elite pressure to improve education has been so intense, state policymakers have had to use instruments with high visibility and the potential for generating immediate, broad-based political support. Capacity-building instruments, in contrast, require considerable time to produce their intended effects. Nevertheless, a number of policies that relied on other types of instruments had capacity-building as a secondary purpose. For example, the teacher trainee program in California is a system-changing instrument designed to recruit more people into teaching by expanding the eligible pool, but it also includes a means for providing new teachers with needed skills.

Regardless of which instruments they selected, state policymakers in all five states attempted to balance democratic control and professionalism in their design of teacher policies. Both values entered into their definitions of the problems and their expectations of what a particular policy ought to accomplish. Rarely, however, were the two values accorded equal weight. Their relative status at any given time

[3]Although 1983 through 1986 were the years of greatest activity for teacher policy, the five sample states, like most other states, enacted some legislation prior to that period. For example, Arizona, Florida, and Georgia mandated new teacher certification tests between 1975 and 1981. In several instances, these earlier policies shaped the design and implementation of later ones.

depended on a variety of political, organizational, and teacher labor-market issues. The playing out of popular control and professionalism values in the selection of policy instruments in each of the five sample states is described below.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM AND SELECTING A POLICY INSTRUMENT

Arizona

Arizona's major teacher policy reform is a six-year career ladder demonstration program that currently includes 15 of the state's 226 school districts. When the program was initiated, local districts applied to participate and designed their own career ladders within the following criteria established by the state:

- Verification had to be provided that the plan was developed in consultation with the district's teachers and that they supported it.
- A compensation system had to be developed based on a completely restructured salary schedule; the career ladder salary schedule could not be the traditional schedule based on experience and education with only additional stipends added.
- Evaluation procedures had to consist of more than one measure of teacher performance, including performance in relation to student academic progress; districts also had to explain what procedures they used to make certain that teacher performance measures were fair and objective and to show that teachers had opportunities for improving their performance.
- Evidence had to be presented showing that the career ladder provided opportunities for teachers' continued professional advancement (based primarily on their teaching skills), and that each successive level either required advanced skills or involved a combination of advanced skills and additional responsibilities.

State funding for participating districts ranged from approximately $10 per student in the first year of the program (1985–86) to $100 per student in the fourth through sixth years (1988–91).

Although the career ladder program was enacted largely at the initiative of one state legislator who had been active in the national education reform movement, it was widely supported by her legislative colleagues. In defining the problems as they perceived them and in

discussing their expectations for the career ladder, legislators typically stressed holding teachers accountable to an external standard, but they also mentioned factors related to professionalism. Typical comments were:

> Poll after poll had shown that the public was willing to spend more for education if it meant they could get good teachers.
>
> * * * * *
>
> The career ladder was an attempt to develop a way to pay teachers based on an evaluation of their performance, rather than how long they had been teaching.
>
> * * * * *
>
> I hope the career ladder will accomplish classroom reform and that it will improve morale among teachers. In addition, teachers will now be held accountable for what happens in the classroom.
>
> * * * * *
>
> I expect changes in teacher motivation and support for the use of evaluation instruments. I also hope that a collegial atmosphere can be set up with such a system and that there will be a gain in public confidence.

The desire to balance democratic control and professionalism was evident in the criteria for local district participation. Professionalism was promoted by allowing local discretion in the design of the career ladder and by the requirement that teachers be involved in planning their local programs. The need for external, public accountability inherent in democratic control was served by the requirement that uniform teacher evaluation procedures be established and that student achievement be linked to teacher performance.

Several factors shaped the legislature's choice of an inducement approach and its decision to make the program voluntary. First, the use of inducements is consistent with Arizona's dominant political culture, which values minimal governmental regulation and a high level of local autonomy. Second, legislators felt that they had insufficient information about the effects of performance-based compensation systems for teachers, and that more data were needed before any policy was implemented statewide. Consequently, they decided to institute the career ladder as a voluntary, demonstration program.

The legislature assumed that local districts had the ability and the information to design evaluation systems that would reliably link student achievement and teacher performance. As will be discussed in

Sec. IV, this assumption became a major problem when local districts began to implement their career ladders.

California

California has by far the largest number and most diverse combination of recent teacher policies. This diversity is primarily attributable to the nature of state policymaking in California. The policies listed in Table 1 constitute only part of SB 813, a large and complex piece of reform legislation that was enacted in 1983.

California's SB 813 was omnibus legislation, reflecting a compromise among the competing interests and priorities of major state policymakers. Some key legislators wanted to get more money to local school districts, to stop the fiscal "bleeding" that had occurred after the passage of Proposition 13. Policies such as establishing a minimum starting salary[4] for teachers were a way to accomplish that purpose. Legislators were also interested in strengthening teaching as a profession. As one noted, "We wanted to upgrade the teaching profession—raise salaries and recognize people who had done well and bring curriculum to the forefront." From this concern came the mentor teacher program[5] and the teacher trainee program.[6]

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[4]The minimum starting salary program was voluntary for local districts. Those districts wishing to participate had to agree to increase the lowest salary on their schedule by as much as 10 percent per year, up to $18,000 in 1983–84, $19,084 in 1984–85, and $20,200 in 1985–86. In 1983–84, $12 million was allocated from state funds for the program; in 1984–85, $25 million was allocated.

[5]The mentor teacher program is a voluntary program for local districts that pays approximately 5 percent of the state's teachers an additional $4,000 a year to assist other teachers and to engage in activities such as curriculum development and inservice activities. Mentors must be selected by a local district committee comprising a majority of teachers; mentors must spend at least 60 percent of their time in the direct instruction of students; and they cannot evaluate other teachers. Beyond those restrictions, local districts have considerable discretion in how they select and use mentors. In addition to the $4,000 stipend, the state also reimburses local districts $2,000 per mentor to cover support costs such as substitute teachers. The state legislature appropriated $30.8 million for the program in 1984–85; this was $21.2 million less than the funding needed to support the legislatively authorized ratio of one mentor for every 20 classroom teachers (Kaye, 1985). However, by 1987–88, a total of $49.75 million was available—sufficient funding to support 4 percent of the state's teachers. In 1988–89, state funding of $63.5 million will permit participation of the full 5 percent for the first time (Gaines and Cornett, 1988).

[6]The teacher trainee program allows local districts the option of hiring uncredentialed teachers as trainees. Districts that do so must establish a two-year training plan and assign each trainee a mentor. Trainees can be employed only in departmental settings within schools, thus limiting them to junior and senior high schools. After completing traineeship, a candidate is recommended to the state for credentialing by a local district in much the same way that education schools recommend candidates. The state provides no funding to local districts for the trainee program.

At the same time, the governor and his advisers saw teacher unionization as a major problem and wanted to give local school districts more control over personnel policy. Thus, SB 813 also contains provisions to make it easier for school management to fire probationary teachers and to reassign and lay off tenured ones.[7] Although his influence on teacher policy was minimal, the state superintendent of public instruction was very influential in shaping other parts of SB 813 related to student standards and coursework policy. He and his staff emphasized the need for academic rigor and greater accountability. According to a key respondent in the State Department of Education (SDE):

> A major part of reform is accountability. Accountability is putting on the table what is really being done in schools. Accountability is a means of exerting leverage on the system. In reporting individual schools' performance in the press, the SDE is exercising a public mandate.

While that sentiment did not affect teacher policy directly, it set a tone that emphasized accountability and accorded heightened visibility to a set of uniform indicators comparing the performance of individual schools.

The balance between democratic control and professionalism that was embodied in the teacher policy provisions of SB 813 reflects the political compromises needed to enact such comprehensive legislation. However, the shape that balance took over time also depended on a variety of other factors. For example, for a number of state policymakers, the mentor program represented a way to show movement on teacher policy, while still avoiding the controversial issue of merit pay. The policymakers expected to enact legislation that would strengthen the teaching profession in a more comprehensive way in future years. But a variety of factors, including such pressing issues as serious school facility shortages, the state's constitutional spending limit, and teacher union opposition, prevented those policymakers from advancing their agenda. Similarly, the condition of the teacher labor market in California, with its current shortages, has meant that the externally imposed accountability measures in SB 813 have rarely been implemented in local districts.

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[7]These provisions included requirements that teachers be evaluated every two years (more frequently, if an evaluation was negative); the probation period for new teachers be reduced from three to two years; districts be allowed to dismiss probationary teachers on the basis of local board criteria with only 30 days notice; districts be allowed to lay off and rehire teachers for additional reasons and with more flexible criteria (e.g., coursework, subject-matter tests, junior teachers with superior skills and experience); and notice of dismissal for unprofessional conduct be reduced from 90 to 30 days.

Florida

Recent teacher policy in Florida reflects the continuing tension between democratic control and professionalism. As part of its 1983 reform legislation, the state enacted a master teacher program that provided an annual award of $3,000 to each of the state's most highly qualified teachers. Selection decisions were to be based on scores on a subject-matter test or the possession of a master's degree, and superior achievement on a performance evaluation.

The program was designed and implemented at the state level. Awards were subject to annual appropriations and annual evaluations, which created uncertainty among teacher candidates and an additional assessment burden. In the first year (1984–85), $9.5 million was appropriated for the program, and 3 percent of the state's teachers qualified (about 10 percent of those who applied). Funding for the second year was less than for the first, and payments to teachers remained uncertain, because in the summer of 1986, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) affiliate filed suit, challenging legislative appropriations for the program's second year.

The choice of such a mechanism is largely explained by the sources of political support for education reform in Florida and by the ways the major actors defined the policy problem. The impetus for the master teacher program came from the governor, several key legislators, and members of the business community. Not only did the state's teacher organizations oppose the program, they were generally excluded from the policy development and enactment process. Policymakers saw themselves addressing the problem of low teacher salaries in Florida, but in the context of the strict external accountability the business community was demanding in return for supporting increased fiscal resources to education. As one legislator explained:

> First and foremost were teacher salaries. Too many people were not going into teaching because of the salaries. Florida is the lowest tax state, forty-eighth or forty-ninth, so it is hard to get extra money. Business was resisting; they thought they were just throwing money down a rathole. They didn't want to raise revenues and dump [the money] in education without any guarantee of results. I agreed with them—money is dumped in and never gets to teachers. Also, unions are protective of teachers—they protect the ones that are not so good. You could not get the money to the teachers who deserved it.

The master teacher program encountered serious implementation problems. The performance measurement system selected had been designed to test beginning teachers, not veterans. There were serious logistical problems during the first year: many applications were lost;

tests were scored incorrectly; and test administrations were scheduled without notifying teacher applicants. In 1985, a move was made to abolish the program, but it continued for two more years, largely because of the governor's strong support. The program was eventually repealed, effective July 1, 1987.

During this same period, those interested in strengthening teaching as a profession sought alternatives to the master teacher program. In 1984, the legislature enacted the merit schools program, which was viewed as a partial replacement. This program is voluntary and is locally designed within state guidelines. It awards additional funds to schools (to be shared among school personnel) based on students' test scores and a variety of other criteria.

At the same time, a working group comprising education and business representatives proposed a career ladder for the state. Under the proposal, individual districts would design their own programs within broad state guidelines, and the local career ladders would be implemented within the scope of local collective bargaining. Although the program was enacted, the $90 million statutorily required to trigger the program was not appropriated. The enabling legislation remained in force through fiscal year 1988–89, after which it automatically expired. State policymakers attribute the legislature's unwillingness to appropriate funds for the career ladder to a backlash from the master teacher program and a lack of teacher support for the program. However, the president of the state's AFT affiliate has vowed to work to restore the career ladder program (Mathis, 1988) and is even considering ways that it might be implemented without state funding (Olson, 1987).

Over the past few years, the balance between popular control and professionalism in Florida teacher policy has been skewed in favor of popular control. Political support patterns, the traditional centralizing tendency of state government, and the powerful influence of the business community largely explain the emphasis on statewide performance standards and a differential compensation system. Policymakers have acknowledged the importance of higher salaries for attracting and retaining competent teachers, but have not included teachers in the policy design process, thereby negating professional concerns for participation in work-related decisions and governance.

State policymakers also jeopardized the success of the master teacher program by assuming that state government had the technical and administrative capacity to monitor teachers' performance reliably. Given the limitations of teacher evaluation research and the inability to identify a set of teacher behaviors that are uniformly linked to effective student learning across grade levels, subject areas, and types of students, the state's capacity was in fact extremely limited (Darling-

Hammond and Berry, 1988). The program was further constrained by a short implementation time frame that led the state to use a performance evaluation system designed to assess beginning teachers for minimum competencies. As would be expected, experienced teachers were able to redirect their actions consistent with the evaluation instrument and perform well on it. Consequently, the master teacher program ended up serving neither the goals of democratic control nor those of professionalism.

Georgia

Georgia's recent teacher policies, like those in California, must be viewed in the context of the state's comprehensive reform legislation, Quality Basic Education (QBE), enacted in 1985. The legislation had two basic purposes: to improve the quality of education through more sufficient and equitable funding and to standardize school systems across the state through a statewide basic curriculum and statewide performance standards. A market-sensitive salary for beginning teachers[8] and a requirement that teachers pass subject-matter and performance tests for recertification[9] are consistent with these two purposes. The QBE reforms recognized the need to improve the status of

[8]A market-sensitive salary means that the minimum salary base for a teacher with a bachelor's degree and no experience must be comparable to the beginning salary of recent graduates of the university system of Georgia with bachelor's degrees who are entering jobs in Georgia with comparable entry requirements. This latter salary is multiplied by ten-twelfths (because of the teacher's shorter work year) to establish the minimum salary base for teachers. The rest of the salary schedule in the Georgia program was also restructured to accelerate pay increases and allow teachers to reach higher salary levels in fewer years.

[9]The Teacher Certification Test (TCT) includes 28 different subject-matter tests for specific certification fields. The tests are quite broad in their focus. For example, all science teachers are required to take the same test, which includes biology, physics, and chemistry. Teachers whose certificates expired in 1986 were given one year to pass the test; once they passed the test, they did not have to take it again.

The NEA affiliate in Georgia filed suit in federal court, charging that the TCT is racially biased. While the case was pending, the testing program continued to be implemented (Press and Washington, 1987). In early 1988, however, the state teacher organization and the state of Georgia reached an out-of-court settlement that allows the state to continue to use its teacher competency tests for initial certification and for the recertification of practicing teachers. In return, the state has agreed to revise all its subject-area tests by September 1991; provide a free study course for teachers who still have to pass the tests; and pay "study grants" of $6,000 to the approximately 325 teachers who lost their certification in fall 1987, and thus their jobs, because they failed the examination (Rodman, 1988).

Teachers are also required to take the Teacher Performance Assessment Instrument (TPAI) for certification. The TPAI covers 14 competencies that are observed through 45 indicators. Teachers must meet performance requirements on eight competencies; they have three years and six opportunities to do this.

teaching, but they also emphasized democratic control through external accountability.

Legislators stressed these dual objectives in the ways they defined the policy problem and framed their expectations about QBE:

> Defining a basic education and figuring out how to fund it was the problem. There was certainly a consensus on this, on setting up a standard school system with checks and balances.
>
> * * * * *
>
> QBE is trying to improve the status and visibility of the profession.
>
> * * * * *
>
> QBE means that teachers have to be more alert and principals have to get busy and prove they are capable.

In expressing these sentiments, legislators were also reflecting the concerns of the business community, some of whose members were key actors in the passage of QBE. This group wanted to create educational conditions conducive to greater economic development in the state. Many viewed Georgia's system of elected local superintendents (in 117 of the state's 180 districts) as an obstacle to upgrading the overall quality of the system. Creating uniform performance standards for teachers and students was viewed as a means of making these local systems more accountable to the state as a whole, while avoiding the politically infeasible alternative of abolishing the elective positions.

At the same time, political and business leaders recognized that making Georgia's educational system more attractive to out-of-state firms also required making teaching more attractive to competent people. In addition to raising teacher salaries statewide, which had the effect of increasing the state's average teacher salary 23.7 percent between 1983 and 1986 (from $18,631 to $23,046), the state also considered implementing a career ladder. As part of QBE, a task force was created that included representatives from the political, business, and education communities. The task force issued its report in June 1986 and recommended a career ladder plan based on a single, statewide evaluation system. This recommendation, given the problems with other statewide career ladders and coupled with a price tag of between $175 and $200 million a year when the program is fully implemented, has limited action to a small pilot program in five districts; the program will not pay any salary supplements until 1991.

The recent history of teacher policy in Georgia shows a movement away from the almost sole emphasis of the late 1970s on accountability

standards imposed from outside teaching to a growing concern about strengthening teaching as a profession. However, the political environment (particularly the system of elected superintendents and the concerns of the business community) and the large fiscal commitment required have slowed movement toward a more equal balance between popular control and professionalism.

Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania's recent teacher policies revolve around State Board of Education (SBE) mandates that require six course credits (or equivalent inservice) every five years for renewal of teachers' permanent certificates; require local districts to establish an induction program for new teachers; and require new teachers to pass a version of the National Teacher Examination (NTE).[10] The state funded the development of the NTE but provided no additional funds to local districts to meet the other two mandates.

Although state policymakers believed that such requirements would accord teaching greater identity as a profession, their major motivation seemed to be ensuring more public accountability:

> Chapter 49 [the SBE mandate] will verify the competency of teachers to the public. It will raise the public's confidence and assure a smooth transition for teachers and assure they stay up to date (SEA official).

* * * * *

> Chapter 49 was addressed at the problems of lousy teachers, without subject matter knowledge and ineffective in the classroom, and the fact that teachers are thrown into schools without much support. They had no standard preparation and the test would at least assure a standard threshold level of knowledge (governor's education aide).

* * * * *

> Chapter 49 should result in more selectivity in admitting students to schools of education and better teachers because beginning teachers will now have more support (legislator).

While endorsing the testing of new teachers and local induction programs, the state's two teacher unions opposed the continuing professional development (CPD) requirements, arguing that they were unfair

[10]The NTE has been customized for Pennsylvania and covers basic skills, subject matter, and general and professional knowledge. The requirement that new teachers be tested became effective June 1, 1987.

to practicing teachers who had already met state certification requirements. The unions appealed to the General Assembly (the state legislature): The AFT affiliate advocated legislation that exempted teachers with master's degrees from the CPD requirement, and the NEA affiliate opposed all types of CPD requirements. The legislature decided to retain the CPD requirements but exempt teachers with master's degrees.

Pennsylvania's policies emphasize democratic control through mandated certification testing and the CPD requirements. At the same time, the state has acknowledged the need to create more supportive and professional conditions for new teachers by requiring that local districts establish induction programs. The reliance on mandates is attributable to several factors: Unlike the other states in our sample, Pennsylvania had not established minimum standards for teachers during the 1970s. Thus, requiring the testing of new teachers represented the beginning of a policy cycle that the other states had initiated some five years earlier. For Pennsylvania, unfunded mandates were also a way to show policy movement in response to national calls for educational reform, despite the fiscal constraints caused by a downturn in the state's economy.

CONCLUSIONS

On balance, in all five states, democratic control in public school teaching was given greater emphasis than professionalism. This focus was most often evident in the adoption of performance standards that were defined through the political process, with limited input from teachers or the organizations that represent them (McDonnell and Pascal, 1988). The emphasis on democratic control implied a belief that teacher quality had diminished and no longer met the electorate's performance expectations for a public institution. This perception was further validated by data showing that new teaching entrants were scoring lower on tests of academic ability than peers choosing to join other professions, and that the more academically able left teaching earlier and in greater proportions than their colleagues (Schlechty and Vance, 1981; Weaver, 1983; Darling-Hammond, 1984). Rather than allowing the teaching profession to rejuvenate itself from within, state officials enacted policies requiring teachers to conform to performance criteria designed by public agencies and private test developers. They assumed that such an approach would provide standards the electorate would view as legitimate, and that the public would be convinced that policymakers were taking active responsibility for the state's schools.

At the same time, strengthening teaching as a profession was also a goal of state policy agendas. Mechanisms such as career ladders and mentor teacher programs were enacted as ways to make teaching a more attractive occupation. In requiring that local districts involve teachers in the design and operation of these programs, policymakers acknowledged the legitimacy of professional self-determination. However, they still advocated the use of a kind of accountability (linking student achievement with assessments of teacher performance) that was at odds with professional judgments about good teaching practice.

Concentration on policies that originated and were managed by outsiders, at the expense of professional self-governance, also meant that the expectations inherent in some of them exceeded state and local capacity. This was particularly true of the evaluation procedures for the career ladder in Arizona and the master teacher program in Florida. These programs assumed not only that teachers had the capacity to respond in ways consistent with the policies' intent, but also that those monitoring their performance could measure it reliably. Similarly, certification requirements such as the TCT and TPAI in Georgia assumed that these tests could validly measure whether a teacher's subject-matter and pedagogical knowledge met minimum entry standards, and that teachers would not skew their behavior to perform well on those indicators.

At the other end of the continuum are policies that make few demands on local district capacity and embody a minimal concern with accountability, e.g., the mentor teacher program in California. Such programs are easier to implement and they encourage greater professionalism, but the tradeoff may be either that the goals of the larger political system are subverted by narrow group interests or the effectiveness of the program is diminished by inefficient resource allocation. Although such professionalism-focused policy instruments stand in sharp contrast to those whose requirements exceed local capacity or whose goals are inconsistent with either professional norms or the concerns of local teachers, the overall effect of the two may be quite similar: a failure to meet policymakers' expectations. The argument, then, for balancing democratic control and professionalism in the design of teacher policies is not just the normative one that both values are legitimate; it is also a very practical one which suggests that without such a balance, implementation may be problematic.

The next section examines what happened when the teacher policies enacted in the five sample states were implemented in local districts.

IV. LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS

Across the five states, there is considerable diversity in the degree of implementation, the extent to which problems have been encountered, and the scope of policy effects.[1] The implementation of California's teacher policies was virtually problem-free, although the effects were quite marginal. On the other hand, Arizona and Florida encountered significant implementation problems, but their policies have exerted a moderate impact on education in the state. Georgia's teacher testing policies have had no significant implementation problems, but their long-term impact on the state's educational system may be considerable. Because Pennsylvania's policies have been in effect for a shorter period, their effects cannot yet be evaluated.

Differences in implementation patterns are not explained by conventional factors such as whether the state or the local district is responsible for implementation. In fact, similarities in the experience of states as different as Arizona and Florida in implementing quite different policies suggest that explanations may lie less in the organization with implementation responsibilities than in the policy design itself—its underlying assumptions about problem definition and solution and the way it balances democratic control and professionalism.

Finally, it is necessary to preface this analysis of local-level implementation and effects with a caveat: Some of the policies assume an extended implementation period, and all assume a long time frame for generating expected effects. For example, we will not know whether certification testing or teacher induction programs have achieved their intended outcomes (e.g., improved teaching quality, higher student achievement) for some years. Similarly, a career ladder is unlikely to influence teacher attraction or retention until it has been in place for some time and its track record is widely known. Therefore, the focus in this discussion of the local effects of state teacher policies must necessarily be on intermediate effects (e.g., on teacher attitudes toward their jobs and their colleagues, on the delivery of educational services, etc.). In addition, some of the implementation problems identified are typical startup problems that will tend to be rectified as a policy

[1]This analysis is based on data collected by researchers from RAND, Rutgers, and the University of Wisconsin-Madison in February-March and May-June 1987. Interviews were conducted with local superintendents, school board members, district personnel administrators, teacher union leaders, principals, and teachers in 50 schools in 19 districts. These data include interviews with 139 teachers.

matures and organizational routines are established. At the same time, the examination of these policies in their early stages can reveal more serious problems, particularly those related to basic design features, and can indicate the extent to which policies are moving in a direction consistent with their expected effects. While an early analysis of implementation patterns and effects cannot provide a definitive answer about whether or not a specific policy "worked" in some ultimate sense, it can provide a reliable gauge of the policy's long-term potential for success, and it can indicate whether modifications or new directions would enhance that potential.

LOCAL RESPONSES TO STATE TEACHER POLICIES

Arizona

Three districts in the Arizona study sample were selected to participate in the demonstration career ladder; a fourth applied but was turned down on the grounds that it had not created a truly separate salary schedule. Although the experience of the three has differed in significant ways because of varying local priorities and capacity, two factors are common to all:

- Very high transaction costs have been incurred by school administrators and participating teachers, who have had to spend considerable time and effort to meet the program's evaluation requirements.
- The teachers who participate in the program generally regard it positively, while those who do not participate view it with skepticism and even hostility.[2]

The transaction costs stem from the need to evaluate teachers fairly and reliably, to apply some measure of student achievement, and to link the performance measures with teacher compensation levels. Although the evaluation procedures differ from district to district—

[2]This finding is consistent with survey results reported by the Center for Excellence in Education at Northern Arizona University as part of its legislatively mandated evaluation of the career ladder program. A survey of 3,851 teachers from all districts participating in the career ladder program showed that career ladder teachers exhibit strong support for assumptions embodied in the concept (e.g., that it attracts high-quality people, improves instruction, improves perceived professional status), while nonparticipants are quite negative about them. For example, 60.7 percent of those placed on a career ladder agreed that the program will attract high-quality people into the teaching profession, compared with 37.2 percent of the nonparticipants. Similarly, 63.3 percent of the career ladder teachers believe that the career ladder program will improve student academic progress, compared with 37.9 percent of the nonparticipants (Packard et al., 1987).

some use only administrators, and others also use peer evaluators—the time and effort involved is considerable. The following description of the process by a middle school principal is typical:

> Between October and March, I spend 70 percent of my time evaluating teachers for the career ladder. I have a pre-conference before each observation, which lasts from 40 minutes to one hour. For probationary teachers and first-year teachers, I spend five days observing them in the classroom (three consecutive days in the fall and two in the spring). These are "bell-to-bell" observations at which teachers are rated on 70 different indicators. I then spend an additional two to four hours in conference with the teachers, with more time needed to write up each evaluation. Tenured teachers are observed for three consecutive days once a year and have a pre- and a post-conference. The tradeoff is that I don't have time to wander the halls or drop in on classrooms.

This particular principal's district did not immediately link student achievement and teacher performance, and it experimented for a year with a test of cognitive abilities to establish baseline data from which expected gains could be determined for different classrooms.

In the first year of the program, one district in the fieldwork sample included student scores on state and district standardized tests as part of career ladder candidates' performance evaluations. It experimented with two different scoring systems where student achievement could count for either 35 or 50 percent of teachers' final scores. However, because the district wanted to take teachers' own curricular goals for their students into consideration, the teachers were asked to submit documentation about classroom objectives and any diagnostic measures they used. The district, in requesting this, acknowledged that as professionals, teachers have legitimate objectives that transcend the basic skills typically measured on standardized tests. The tradeoff was that career ladder candidates incurred significant transaction costs. Indeed, the time burden was viewed by most career ladder candidates as one of the most serious disadvantages of the program. One middle school teacher said:

> The tremendous amount of time involved (you lose vacations and weekends) is a disadvantage. You have to focus on every single objective. I was overly ambitious and had to rewrite all my work and my tests and I still didn't get all the objectives covered. The career ladder also doesn't judge some parts of teaching that are important—that is, creative or innovative teaching in any form. There is also no real way to handle teachers fairly who have more than one preparation or who use more than one textbook.

And according to an elementary school teacher:

> [The career ladder] required a lot of time. There were no examples of action plans available this first year. I spent five weekends of four- to ten-hour days working on my plan. I felt very good about it when I turned it in.

The transaction costs of evaluating teachers for the career ladder are likely to diminish over time as templates are developed that teachers can use in compiling their documentation, and as the process becomes more routinized and evaluations are required less frequently for teachers already on the career ladder. However, until significant improvements are made in the technology of teacher evaluation, there will be a continuing tradeoff between the efficiency of the process and the need to meet basic fairness and due-process criteria.

Teacher responses to the career ladder have been almost bimodal between those who are participating and those who are not.[3] While they acknowledge the time commitment required and the stress of multiple evaluations, career-ladder candidates see real advantages to the program:

> The advantage of the career ladder is that it causes you to take a more analytical look at what you are doing. You also get more input about what you are doing, and that makes you a better teacher (high school teacher).

* * * * *

> The career ladder helps you focus on what you are teaching by requiring written goals and objectives. It gives you a real focus and direction to your teaching. You are a better-planned teacher; you can't wing it, even for a day (elementary school teacher).

The majority of teachers who have chosen to participate in the program view it positively and believe that it will improve their teaching.

Opinions among nonparticipants are quite different, however. Their response tends to range from skepticism to outright animosity. Resistance is much higher among high school teachers than among teachers in lower grades. However, nonparticipants at all levels talked of the divisiveness of the program. They felt that it created a potential for interpersonal conflict, and that participants were already less willing to share ideas with colleagues and to engage in school-related activities

[3]The two fieldwork sites that still had operating career ladders in the spring of 1987 had very different participation rates. In one, the rate was only 15 percent; in the other, it was close to 70 percent.

that did not count toward their career ladder scores. High school teachers made the following comments:

> The career ladder is going nowhere. It is divisive, and is creating jealousy. Communication about the program is poor. I don't see one set of criteria being used for all people. There is only so much money available. What if 40 teachers qualify and the district can only afford 20? What about teachers who do extracurricular activities? The career ladder will take time away from that. Personally, I think the career ladder has not improved student achievement.

* * * * *

> [The career ladder] has created some jealousies and selfishness. New things in a school atmosphere cause paranoia and fear. Educators have been left alone for so long that it is a real change. The whole idea of accountability in teaching is not very old.

Like transaction costs, negative responses to the career ladder may diminish over time as more teachers gain first-hand familiarity with it. However, nonparticipants' concerns about divisiveness may continue if certain conditions persist. If teachers perceive that their peers who are singled out for higher career ladder status are not the best teachers, the objectivity of the evaluation process will be called into question. Some teachers in the Arizona sample expressed this concern, arguing that the difference between a "satisfactory" and a "commendable" rating on a given indicator was often difficult to distinguish and appeared subjective (for an analysis of these issues in earlier performance-based compensation systems, see Cohen and Murnane, 1985). Divisiveness may also persist if teachers see that fiscal limitations, rather than their failure to meet quality standards, are the reason fewer of them are attaining high career ladder status. In sum, the extent to which transaction costs and negative teacher responses can be managed depends on state and local resource levels and on the capacity of districts to design a fair and efficient evaluation plan.

Beyond the commonalities just discussed, the experience of the three districts with career ladders has been quite different. The variations are largely explained by the ways different districts defined the problem they saw a career ladder addressing and by elements in each local context. Two examples from the fieldwork sample illustrate how these factors have shaped the implementation and short-term effects of career ladders.

One district perceived the career ladder as a way to address the problem of noncompetitive salaries in relation to those in neighboring districts. All teachers who had taught in the district at least one year were offered a $900 bonus to participate in the career ladder program;

95 percent agreed to do so. The district, with considerable input from the teacher organization and individual teachers, designed a career ladder that was based on seniority, inservice, assistance to other teachers, and performance. Because the district had distributed money broadly to most teachers and had based career ladder status partly on seniority, the state withdrew its funding. The district saw its version of a career ladder addressing a real need to raise the entire teacher salary schedule, support beginning teachers, and contribute to teachers' professional development. It believed the state's objectives to be quite different: In the district's view, state policymakers were concerned with evaluation rather than career development; they had one model in mind, rather than encouraging real local variation; and they believed that good teaching is not difficult to measure. According to a school board member:

> The state program conflicts with the idea that teachers should have more say in what goes on in schools.

One principal said:

> It is hard to overestimate the anger this program has caused. . . . The state plan won't work. It would have been better if the state had seen the pilot as a bag of tricks to be tried. But they are not allowing for individual initiatives of districts.

In this district, state and local definitions of the policy problem were similar (i.e., low teacher salaries), but their solutions were quite different. The district believed that all teachers should receive some benefit from the program, and that career development, seniority, and assistance to other teachers should be counted along with student test scores. The state, on the other hand, wanted a system that broke with traditional seniority and educational attainment criteria and that ensured a different form of accountability for teacher performance.

The second district responded to the career ladder very differently, largely because it views the program as meeting a pressing local need, and because its conception of the policy problem and the solution is consistent with the state's. This district is located next to a fast-growing district with higher teacher salaries and has for some years watched its teachers leave to work in the adjacent district. The career ladder was viewed as a way to improve teacher retention by offering the possiblity of a $30,000 salary as early as the sixth year of teaching. Close to 70 percent of the district's teachers are participating in the career ladder. Fewer than 20 percent were placed on the highest rung, but all participants have received significant raises. The district's

annual teacher attrition rate has been reduced from 23 to 10 percent. The extent to which the district views the career ladder as meeting its own needs is revealed in the decision to use some of its own revenue to help fund the ladder and its commitment to continue the program even if state funding ceases (this contrasts with the view of the other districts, which do not plan to continue the career ladder without state funding).

Not only is this district's definition of the policy problem (i.e., the need to retain good teachers) similar to that of the state, the superintendent and his staff are also firmly commited to another part of the state's agenda: increasing accountability by rewarding teachers based on performance. According to the superintendent, "The district believes that teacher salaries should be raised, but they should be tied to performance." He is so commited to this approach that he would like to be able to reduce the salaries of teachers who are not performing.[4]

The balance in this district between democratic control and professionalism is very consistent with that of the state. Teachers participated in designing the district's program; they have received significant salary increases and the opportunity to earn more money more quickly. At the same time, however, their performance is subject to a uniform set of evaluation procedures that were only partly developed by peers. Although they acknowledge the stress involved in the evaluation process, most teachers view it as reasonable. The decline in the attrition rate in the district indicates that the career ladder seems to be producing its intended effects.

Although it is too early to assess the effectiveness of Arizona's career ladder program, early experience suggests both signs of hope and continuing problems. Where state and local definitions of the problem and the appropriate solution are in agreement and the career ladder meets a real local need, the program appears likely to strengthen both public accountability and professionalism. But continuing limitations on districts' ability to evaluate teachers reliably and to link their assessments to compensation levels pose serious tradeoffs between high transaction costs and diminishing the fairness of the process. In addition, many teachers remain skeptical about the benefits of a career

[4]In 1988, the state legislature passed a law allowing career ladder districts to reduce teachers' salaries, with the limitation that they could not reduce them below what those teachers earned before they were placed on the career ladder. The same law would also allow districts to decrease career ladder teachers' salaries back to their level on the regular salary schedule if the pilot program ends and additional state funding is no longer available. However, the current expectation is that if the pilot is found to be to be successful, the legislature will provide sufficient funds to allow all interested districts to participate in the program.

ladder. Their doubts stem from a variety of concerns: the burden of the evaluation process; its seeming inability to distinguish between merely competent teachers and high-performing ones; the potential divisiveness a career ladder may engender within schools; and the lack of clarity about what additional or different responsibilities are incurred by movement up a career ladder. These concerns will need to be addressed if Arizona's career ladder program is to expand beyond a pilot and be implemented permanently.

California

Two major conclusions emerge from the experience of local districts with California's SB 813-related teacher policies. First, the implementation of these policies has been virtually problem-free. The four districts in our fieldwork sample reported that the SB 813 teacher policies in which they participated in no way strained district capacity or caused any serious administrative problems. Second, California's teacher policies have had only limited impact. Although most districts view the programs positively, some decided not to participate in them and view them as peripheral to district priorities. The notable exception in our sample is a large urban district with a chronic teacher shortage, where more than one-third of the teachers have taught for three years or less. In this district, the SB 813 policies were linked as part of an overall strategy to address the district's chronic teacher recruiting and retention problems—which they did with considerable effectiveness. As we will see in the discussion of specific policies, the explanation for both the limited impact in most places and the significant exception lies partly in the nature of the policy instruments used and partly in the match between local problems and state solutions.

By the 1985–86 school year, 83 percent of the districts in the state had decided to participate in the mentor teacher program, with the nonparticipating districts tending to be the smallest ones. In the first few years of the program, the state funded less than the full complement of mentors (approximately 2.5 to 3 percent, instead of the statutory 5 percent). However, this was not a problem for most districts because of limited numbers of applicants.

In a 1985 survey of 291 district mentor teacher coordinators, respondents were asked to characterize the prevailing view of mentors in their districts. About a third characterized mentors as working on their own projects, and another third categorized them as receiving extra pay for extra work. Only 19 percent of the respondents reported that the prevailing view was of mentors receiving extra work for extra skill (Bird, 1986: 13). Coordinators also estimated that mentors spent an average

of 36 percent of their time as mentors working with other teachers; the majority of the remaining time was spent working on instructional materials and engaging in needs assessment and planning (Bird, 1986: 16).

The explanation for these patterns lies in the way the program is conceived and administered in local districts. The mentor teacher program is typically implemented with benefits allocated as broadly as possible and on criteria other than strict merit. This has occurred partly because of the role teacher unions have played in the selection process, and partly because of the peripheral nature of the program in most districts. Bird studied ten districts and found that local teacher organizations often sought arrangements for the program that reflected their own interests. These included "short terms for the mentors (allowing rotation of more teachers through the mentorships), mentors' proposing independent projects, and mentors' confidential service upon individual teachers' request" (Bird, 1986: 24–25). Findings for three of the four California districts in our sample are similar. Mentors serve short terms; they apply by proposing independent projects which are sometimes quite peripheral to district or school needs (e.g., developing a paleontology curriculum); and no explicit selection criteria are used. In fact, in one of the districts, applicants are not observed in their classrooms or even interviewed. Not surprisingly, principals and teachers complained about the program's "lack of focus" and the fact that it "gives money to teachers to write proposals." Others argued that the best teachers are not applying for mentorships.

The situation is quite different in the sample district with serious teacher shortages. This district chose to use its mentor teacher program in combination with the minimum starting salary and the teacher trainee program to improve its recruiting and retention record. All mentors work with beginning teachers, and they must be willing to be transferred to schools with the greatest need for assistance.

The program has not been without its problems: District administrators, principals, and teachers have all complained about the inadequate number of substitute days available; some teachers have questioned the fairness and validity of the selection process; others have argued that mentorships were being used by teachers who wished to move into administration. However, on balance, the program has had a very significant and positive impact, as evidenced by the district's decision to spend over $750,000 of its own budget to supplement state program funding. The comments of a beginning high school teacher are typical of how those assisted by the program view it:

> The mentor basically doesn't sit on your back, he's there for you to get help with specific problems in discipline, preparation, methods, etc. I have a good mentor teacher. He sees that I'm competent. When I go to him, he is full of ideas; he is a good teacher. He always helps with good ideas. It is good to know that he is there if I need him, but that he is not watching me all the time—that could make a person nervous. I can't think of any disadvantages of the program.

This same district has been the state's major participant in the teacher trainee program: 95 percent of the teachers working as trainees between 1984 and 1986 were employed in this district. The California Commission on Teacher Credentialing compared the training and classroom performance of a sample of trainees with that of a matched sample of other beginning teachers (Wright, McKibbon, and Walton, 1987) and produced several striking findings. The first concerns the educational background of the trainees: 29 percent attended University of California campuses, as compared with about 5 percent of the total teacher force, and almost half also had some academic training beyond the bachelor's degree. The second finding is that the teacher trainees performed as well on measures of classroom effectiveness as the beginning teachers who had completed a traditional teacher training program. Finally, 85 percent of the trainees said that they plan to remain in teaching.

Because of the expense involved in designing and administering a teacher training program, very few of the state's 1000+ districts have taken part in the program (only 12 other districts have participated, and most have had no more than one trainee at a time). Even the number of trainees working in the urban district has declined over time, largely because fewer candidates are available who meet the state's criteria (i.e., a bachelor's degree major or minor in the subject to be taught, the passing of a test of basic skills, and the passing of a test of the subject-matter knowledge to be taught). Still, in 1984–85, teacher trainees constituted 28 percent of all new teachers of English, science, and mathematics in the district. Although the overall proportion declined to 17 percent the next year, teacher trainees constituted 28 percent of the district's new teachers of biological sciences in 1984–85 (Wright, McKibbon, and Walton, 1987).

The teacher trainees in our sample were bright, enthusiastic people who were glad to be able to move immediately into a classroom. They expressed impatience with the type of material covered in traditional teacher preparation programs and even argued that much of what was included in the district's training program was of little use to them. One trainee said:

> I have completed all of the required coursework of trainees, and have graduated from the program. I would say that 90 percent of the material I was required to study was junk, and that only 10 percent was good. I hear that from everybody in the program. The things that were helpful were information on how to set up lesson plans; how to deal with classroom problems; and how to set up enrollment books. The other stuff was interesting, but not "real life." I think that all of the participants would agree on which 10 percent of the program is good.

Another trainee said:

> I interviewed with this district and was hired on the spot into the teacher trainee program. They gave me three weeks of orientation which taught me how to write lesson plans, taught me a little bit about classroom management, and put me in a classroom. . . . I was thrown into the fire. After I started teaching, I was required to complete the coursework for my credential. The big problem is that after teaching for two-and-a-half years, [I find that] most of the things that they taught me in the classes are worthless. Maybe 10 to 15 percent of it is congruent with my teaching; the rest of the stuff is a waste of time.

High school principals view how the trainee and mentor programs should work in much the same way:

> The teacher trainee program anticipates the responsibilities and needs of new teachers. It skips the background they haven't needed in the past and emphasizes the daily operation of their jobs (e.g., lesson planning, discipline). The mentor program provides a way to observe and help other teachers in a nonthreatening way.

A 1986 assessment of local district participation in the state-funded minimum teacher salary program indicated that a majority of the state's largest school districts were participating, and major reasons for nonparticipation were an already elevated lowest step on the salary schedule or a lack of beginning teachers in the district (Emmett and Garms, 1986). The study also found that the average entry-level salary in participating sample districts increased at least 27 percent as a result of the state program. The four districts in our fieldwork sample all participated in the program, and again the greatest impact was felt in the large urban district that had major teacher shortages. The state incentive program helped increase starting salaries by 30 percent over three years and was cited by respondents as a major reason for the district's ability to address its shortage problems effectively.

The unique experience of this large urban district illustrates how critical the match between a particular policy and local need is. However, it also raises an interesting issue concerning how inducements

work. Both the career ladder in Arizona and the mentor teacher program in California are inducements in that the state provides additional money to districts and to individual teachers to encourage them to do something they are not already doing. However, Arizona attaches many more regulatory "strings" to its program than California does. The benefits of fewer regulations are that teacher policies were implemented in California with far fewer problems. On the other hand, the mentor program has had much less impact in local districts than it might have had if selection criteria had been more rigorous and mentorships had been focused more precisely on state and local priorities. In establishing the mentor program, state policymakers saw themselves addressing a generic problem of needing to provide teachers with greater status and more support. However, the problem being addressed was never particularly well-defined, notions of professionalism were vague, and few accountability mechanisms were included. The result was a program that generated benefits largely limited to the mentors themselves, unless a district was willing to shape the program to meet a critical local need. The absence of state direction has given districts the flexibility to do this, but it has also meant that if districts choose not to do so, the program's impact will be limited. The contrasting experiences of Arizona and California suggest the importance of not just selecting the appropriate policy instrument, but also deciding how much variation should be allowed in the way funds are used and activities implemented.

Florida

The history of recent teacher policies in Florida is one of trial and error, with policymakers moving through successive attempts to balance the interests of advocates of greater public accountability and those of advocates of greater professionalism for teachers. The now-defunct master teacher program is widely viewed as a major policy failure. In a 1986 report on Florida's educational reforms, a legislative committee concluded:

> The master teacher program has received an overwhelming negative reception by superintendents, administrators and teachers. Of the 58 districts [out of 67 in the state] responding to the legislative survey, 96.6 percent said that the program should not be continued as it currently exists. Thirty-eight of the school districts identified the major impact of the master teacher program to be "low morale of teachers." Most of the superintendents interviewed commented on the extreme "humiliation" and "demoralization" experienced by teachers.

The personnel administrator for a large urban district in the fieldwork sample characterized the program as having "birth defects from the outset" and commented that "if you put someone in a closed room and said, 'create a master teacher program that will fail,' then what Florida did would fit the bill."

At first glance, the failure of the master teacher program seems to have been the result of such classic implementation problems as a compressed time frame and a lack of communication between the State Education Agency (SEA) and local principals and teachers. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it is clear that the program suffered from more fundamental design problems. The legislative history of the master teacher program resulted in a policy that was intended to reward a small proportion of the state's teachers (only 3 percent were selected in the first year) through a bureaucratic accountability mechanism. In mandating that the SEA accept primary responsiblity for implementing the program and evaluating teachers, legislators incorrectly assumed that the organization could mobilize sufficient capacity to overcome the vast information gap between what a state agency can know about classroom teaching performance and what individual teachers actually do in their own classrooms.

The erroneous assumption that this information gap could be effectively bridged lies at the core of subsequent design problems, particularly those related to the evaluation instruments. There was a widespread perception that the Florida Performance Measurement System (FPMS), originally developed for use with beginning teachers, was not a "valid vehicle for identifying outstanding teachers" (Florida Legislature, 1986: 5). Furthermore, inconsistencies were reported in the scoring of the instrument. Similarly, a consulting firm hired by the legislature to evaluate the program reported that six of the fifteen subject-matter tests developed for it could not be considered reliable at 0.85 or above, and that only 20 percent of the teachers surveyed believed that the test items were valid measures of what the best teachers in the field should know (Florida Legislature, 1986: 9–10).

Other design problems identified in the legislative study were the absence of feedback to teacher applicants that would enable them to use the evaluation process to guide improvement, and a failure to specify any additional roles or responsiblities for individuals designated as master teachers.

The evidence from the three fieldwork districts reinforces and amplifies these statewide survey findings. Not only were teachers uniformly negative in their assessment of the program, even those who obtained master teacher status reported that it had no effect on their teaching. Teachers and principals alike complained about the paperwork burden

the program imposed, the lack of clarity about the purpose of the classroom observations, and major inconsistencies in scoring across observers and between how elementary and high school teachers were assessed.

The experience of one high school teacher is typical of those who decided to participate in the program:

> First, there were two observations, one hour each. The first evaluation was done by someone outside the building and it freaked me out so badly after getting that low score back that my heart still pounds when I have a visitor or an evaluation of any kind. I used to actually invite people into my classroom because I knew I did a good job. It will take me years to get over it. The second step was taking the subject area test. It was so disorganized that you can't believe it. They kept us waiting two hours while they handed out the test. I ended up being very sorry I participated and extremely upset by my low scores. The first observation score was just below the cutoff point. I didn't know that principals were free to add more points when they felt it important or earned. So I left school for the summer crestfallen, thinking I didn't make it. When I returned early in October, I got this big certificate in the mail one day congratulating me on being a master teacher and it just didn't matter anymore. In the beginning, I had wanted it very badly, but the process had taken away any joy I might have felt. Another problem was that you saw people get it whom you knew were not good teachers and didn't care about kids. At the same time, you saw wonderful teachers bypassed. It just wasn't fair.

Policymakers sought to remedy some of the major design flaws of the master teacher program when they replaced it with the merit schools program. In place of a statewide performance measurement system, local districts were allowed to develop their own award criteria and assessment procedures within general state guidelines. Awards to individual teachers were replaced with school-level prizes to be shared among all staff. Thus, professional values were served by stressing local development and school-site collegiality, and the lack of reliable and valid information inherent in a state-directed teacher evaluation process was minimized.

In its evaluation, the legislative committee found that in the first year of the merit schools program, about half the districts in the state participated. Reasons for nonparticipation included the refusal of the local teacher union to approve participation (one of the statutory requirements) and a belief that limiting awards to schools in the upper quartile of relative or expected gain on standardized achievement tests

was too limiting.[5] The legislative committee report also found that even among program participants, the response of teachers, principals, and parents varied considerably from district to district (Florida Legislature, 1986).

Findings from the three fieldwork districts reinforce the committee's conclusions. Two of the three districts participated in the program. In the first, teacher opinion about the merit school program was almost evenly divided. In the second, the district administration endorsed the merit-school concept strongly and even supplemented the state grant by about 30 percent with its own local funding; teachers, on the other hand, were less united in their praise. Even though local funds were used to ensure that all schools which met their goals received a financial award, some school staff felt that they had been coerced into participating by the superintendent's requirement that all schools develop an improvement plan whether they expected to participate in the program or not. In the third district, the teacher union refused to approve involvement, based on the vote of a small group of members who turned out for the ballot.

Comments from teachers not only illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the merit schools program, but also reveal that the tension between external accountability (through student test scores) and professionalism continues in Florida even with this more professionally oriented policy:

> Well, the advantage clearly is that it pulls faculties together. They have to evaluate their ongoing instructional program and decide what they would want to do to improve it. The plus is that it really causes people to work collaboratively. School-wide goals are determined, but the real heart of it seems to be within the individual departments where people decide what their goals are and how they're going to meet them. And of course the money is a reward, too, when you win.
>
> The disadvantage is that it makes individual teachers feel terrible if they do something that others can interpret as pulling test scores down and thus preventing the school from getting a meritorious school award.
>
> * * * * *
>
> The program had a positive effect on our school and faculty. We were not a winner, but we did develop a super program that was initiated with just kids in mind. I have to admit that after each loss, a

[5]In response to local district concerns, the legislature modified the program in 1985 so that achievement test scores were only one measure to be used in determining which schools were in the upper quartile. Other criteria could be based on schools' ability to accomplish district-established goals and objectives.

> negative feeling returned. Teachers were less enthused, kids were less interested, and the same was true for the community. It is a real negative for schools that don't win the award. We lost simply because our Stanford Achievement Test scores did not improve as much as some other schools [i.e., into the upper quartile of the district].
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> We are now a merit school and worked very hard to achieve that status. The positive effects of the meritorious schools program is the sense of pride that develops in teachers, parents, the kids, and the community. It is really positive to see the consensus and cohesiveness that generalizes from involvement in developing a meritorious school plan to other issues in the school. Our kids are very proud.
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> • • • • •
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> [The] merit schools program does nothing to improve education and it's a lot of work. It runs us in circles, but my school voted to participate in the meritorious schools program and I'll help us do what needs to be done. In my opinion, we need to concentrate less on the public relations activities, and more on the core curriculum, and merit schools forces an emphasis on public relations.

In explaining teacher policy implementation patterns in Florida, two policy design issues were identified: the assumptions policymakers made about state capacity to measure teacher performance reliably and the extent to which democratic control and professionalism were balanced. These two factors largely explain the failure of the master teacher program. Although they were at least partially remedied in the design of the merit schools program, this "second-generation" policy has still experienced an uneven implementation course.

This analysis suggests that the explanation lies in two aspects of the local context: the role of local teacher unions and local policy priorities. The local teacher union was largely responsible for one of the three fieldwork districts not participating in the merit schools program and for another enthusiastically embracing it. Although union leadership in the nonparticipating district viewed the policy positively and was willing to negotiate its implementation, it deferred to the small minority of members who turned out to vote on the issue. Union leaders in the district that participated enthusiastically view the merit schools program as a vehicle for strengthening teacher professionalism, and as a complement to initiatives negotiated through the collective bargaining contract that include a teacher professional development center and efforts to give teachers increased decisionmaking responsibilities. Union interest in stimulating greater professionalism is also

shared by the school district administration, which views this as one of its major policy priorities. Similarly, the district that supplemented the merit schools program with local funds sees that policy as consistent with its own interest in encouraging school-based management and planning for educational improvement.

As in the Arizona and California districts, the Florida districts found that teacher policies based on inducements can produce very different effects, depending on some key design features. In all three states, allowing local discretion in shaping program criteria and selection procedures resulted in significant variation in the extent of implementation and the degree to which policymakers' expectations were met. By decreasing its control over policies for rewarding teacher performance, the state can facilitate a better balance between professionalism and democratic control in districts that find the policies consistent with their own priorities and have the capacity to implement them. In those districts where such a match does not exist, however, neither professionalism nor democratic control are served by state policies that permit significant local discretion. On the other hand, the pursuit of consistent implementation through a state-directed process can produce perverse consequences, particularly when the state lacks the ability to evaluate merit on the basis of reliable and valid information.

Georgia

In Georgia, the local context played a more significant role in mediating the effect of state teacher policies than it did in any of the other sample states. In requiring that teachers pass a subject-matter test (TCT) and a performance assessment (TPAI) for certification and recertification, state policymakers saw themselves addressing the lack of a standard school system across the state. This attempt at greater public accountability was balanced with the funding of a market-sensitive salary to strengthen teaching as a profession. However, a combination of local labor-market factors and priorities resulted in different implementation histories for these policies across the state.

Fiscal capacity, which largely determines the size of the local teacher salary supplement, varies across the four sample Georgia districts. District officials and teachers view the state-funded increase in teacher salaries positively but believe that it has only allowed teachers to stay even with increases in the overall cost of living. The amount of the local district's supplement to the state salary contribution largely determines whether the district can compete as part of a statewide, regional, or national labor market as compared with a narrowly defined local one. For example, the small rural district in our sample

supplements the state minimum teacher salary by approximately $300 a year; the small city, by about $1,000 to $1,700 a year. These relatively small amounts compare unfavorably with those in the two metropolitan sample districts, where the local supplement typically enhances the state minimum by about 15 percent, or more than $3,000 a year. Furthermore, large urban and suburban districts provide teachers with additional fringe benefits, such as dental insurance, that are rarely offered in smaller and poorer districts. In establishing a market-sensitive salary, the state moved to create an important enabling condition of greater professionalism, but differences in local fiscal capacity mitigated the effects of the policy.

A second local factor relates to individual district priorities. In three of the four districts in our sample, the recruitment and retention of black teachers is a major issue. These districts serve majority black student populations and have attempted to increase their numbers of black teachers. The rural and small-city districts have encountered the most serious problems, because they are largely confined to recruiting from a few traditionally black colleges in their immediate areas. Their noncompetitive salaries and the particularly difficult teaching conditions in the rural district also mean that they have a serious teacher turnover problem. The requirement that teachers must pass the TCT and TPAI has not helped local districts in meeting their minority teacher hiring goals, although this has been less of an obstacle than some originally anticipated. Of the 20,000 teachers statewide who had to pass the TCT by August 1987, only 327 failed. Although three-quarters of those failing were black, 90 percent of the black teachers taking the TCT passed (Rodman, 1988). The small rural district was hardest hit by the failure of teachers to pass the TCT, but even the large urban district had to reassign teachers who failed the test from regular classrooms to positions as full-time substitutes. For these districts, then, the state testing requirement complicated local efforts to maintain a racially balanced teaching force.

The fourth district in the state sample is currently piloting a teacher evaluation system based on the TPAI and is planning to develop its own career ladder, in the hope that it can avoid having to implement the state model, if one is finally enacted. For this district, then, state policy has served as a goad and as a starting point for more extensive policies to address local priorities.

In addition to their interaction with factors related to local context, implementation of the TCT and TPAI requirements raises fundamental questions about the balance between public accountability and professionalism. The concept underlying the TCT and TPAI is not incompatible with the notion of entry standards and certification

embodied in professional values. But those standards are being implemented through a public agency, rather than one controlled by the profession. The state definition of what teachers should know is not necessarily compatible with what teachers themselves think they should know. Some teachers question the validity of the TCT because it tests subject-matter knowledge beyond what an individual teacher might need to fulfill his or her immediate teaching responsibilities. For example, a high school biology teacher is certified in science and must therefore pass a test that includes questions on chemistry and physics. A number of teacher respondents argued that they should be held accountable only for knowing subject matter they actually teach. This sentiment was expressed particularly by those teaching in the sciences and those teaching lower-level classes. One teacher said:

> The math test covers all levels of math instruction at the high school. This presents us with a problem. In order to serve the kinds of students that we have, we as math teachers are forced to teach basic skills and then it seems as if we are being punished because in order to pass these exams, we need to be able to answer questions on things like calculus. It's very difficult for a teacher who has been in the system for twelve or fifteen years and has been teaching nothing but remedial mathematics courses to pass an examination like this. In what context are they going to be able to maintain the skill levels in calculus required of these examinations?

Administrators and teachers have largely accepted the TPAI as a means of providing some performance-based data about teaching behaviors that new teachers ought to know. Respondents noted that the TPAI requirement provides a structure for novice teachers and motivates districts to provide additional support during the first year of teaching. At the same time, requiring teachers to produce portfolios as part of the TPAI process significantly increases the time and paperwork burden imposed on them. The advantages and disadvantages of the TPAI requirement were summed up by two beginning teachers:

> TPAI is very detailed and has strict guidelines. TPAI reinforces what you learned in college, but it is so strict—like if you go to the right side of the room when you were supposed to go to the left or if you don't smile or use your hands, you get marked down. They expect you to exhibit 300 skills in 50 minutes. They are all important skills, but you can't exhibit them in one day—at least without putting on a performance. I put 100 hours into developing the portfolio [in science]. I know my kids who were not in the classes I had planned for were suffering.

* * * * *

> The TPAI is something else. I passed with a 100 percent just the other day (it was my second time). The structure helps you a lot, but you spend a lot of time on it. The first time I took it, I had only been teaching two months and had so much to do. I was working 60+ hours a week teaching and putting the portfolio together. If it wasn't for the librarian and the instructional lead teacher, it would not have been possible—their support was endless with materials, copying, suggestions. They even sent a card and flowers on the day of my assessment.

Despite general acceptance of the TPAI for beginning teachers, respondents saw much less legitimacy in using it to evaluate practicing teachers. They felt that when applied to this group, the assessment trivialized teaching and certainly was not a way to identify outstanding teachers.

Georgia has retained state-level control over the design of its teacher policies. Yet even here, local fiscal capacity and district priorities have resulted in different implementation patterns across the state. The inducement effect of a market-sensitive salary has been sharply constrained by the size of local salary supplements. Similarly, the effects of teacher testing requirements have varied, depending on the nature of the local teacher force and district preferences as to its composition.

The Georgia experience suggests that with some adjustment, democratic control and professional norms could be accommodated within the same general policy framework. Although teachers raised questions about the validity of the particular instruments used for the TCT and TPAI, they were generally supportive of the concept of enforcing entry standards for the profession. The challenge, then, is to design more valid and reliable instruments and, even more difficult, to reach a consensus about performance standards for practicing teachers.

Pennsylvania

State teacher policies have had a limited impact thus far in Pennsylvania. Consequently, it is not clear how democratic control and professionalism concerns will manifest themselves over time. There are several reasons for the limited, short-term impact. First, the continuing professional development (CPD) requirements, the establishment of local induction programs, and the testing of new teachers have been in effect only since June 1987. Second, the focus on induction is not particularly relevant at this time because, with the exception of the largest districts, few are hiring new teachers. Declining student enrollments and tight fiscal constraints have meant that many districts have, in fact, had to reduce their teacher force over the past ten years. Three of the four Pennsylvania districts in the fieldwork sample have

virtually no new teachers because the few who are hired each year are people who previously worked in the district and were part of an earlier force reduction. However, a large proportion of the state's teacher force is over 45 years of age, so the induction program is likely to take on much greater importance over the next decade. Finally, because the teacher union was successful in having teachers with master's degrees exempted from the CPD requirement, only a limited number of practicing teachers will be affected by the program. For example, in one district in the sample, 93 percent of the teachers have master's degrees.

Despite (or perhaps, because of) the program's limited applicability, the teachers interviewed were largely supportive of testing new teachers and providing them with an induction program. The comments of several teachers were typical:

> I think it's an understatement to say that [the testing of new teachers and an induction program] are necessary. There are a lot of people sliding through and getting a degree and getting certified.

* * * * *

> I firmly believe that the NTE should always be given. It should work as the bar exam to make us more professional.

Several teachers in the one large urban district in the sample complained about the manner in which the induction program was being implemented, but they recognized that it is a way to help retain first-year teachers. Although this district sees the induction program as central to its own priorities and has spent local funds on it, the program generally suffers from a serious lack of resources. There is only one master teacher available for every 30 to 40 new teachers. Consequently, there is virtually no one-on-one assistance provided new teachers (as is provided in the large urban district in California), and even planned classroom follow-ups to supplement evening workshops have not been fully implemented.

The tensions between professionalism and democratic control may begin to emerge as these programs are implemented more widely. Local teacher unions are working together to make certain that they play an active role in the design of local induction and CPD programs. The issues of concern to them are the resources (salary and release time) available to mentor teachers; the nature of their responsibilities, particularly whether or not they will be involved in evaluating other teachers; and the overall design and content of professional development programs. Depending on the direction these initiatives take, they may become a vehicle for greater professional control over induction and staff development.

Counterpoised to these efforts is a growing interest on the part of new State Department of Education (SDE) leadership in establishing clear directions for local CPD and induction programs through the state plan approval process. As the policy was originally conceived, local districts had considerable autonomy in the design of their programs. Many districts conceived their programs as providing an orientation to school and district operations and placed less emphasis on presenting a systematic approach to improving instruction. The SDE is now stressing this element of induction and CPD programs. Although it is not recommending any particular approach, the SDE is requiring that districts adopt a systematic method for improving instruction, and it has been returning plans that do not meet that criterion. Local districts and teacher unions still have considerable discretion in the approaches they choose, but the new requirement does impose more external accountability than had previously been considered necessary. At this point, it is too early to predict whether Pennsylvania's teacher policies will promote an effective balance between democratic control and professionalism. That will depend not only on the compromises that are reached among the SDE, local district administrators, and teacher unions, but also on whether state policy to promote greater teacher professionalism can rely solely on a set of mandates without creating some inducements to attract and retain good teachers.

CONCLUSIONS

We have examined a number of policy design features as a way of understanding implementation outcomes and intermediate policy effects. One factor, the consistency of problem definition across governmental levels (i.e., did state policymakers and local school districts define the policy problem to be addressed in a similar way?), was particularly important in the case of inducements. At least one sample district in each of three states—Arizona, California, and Florida—viewed state teacher policies as addressing a critical local problem (e.g., a teacher shortage, teacher attrition, a desire to grant teachers greater participation in school-level decisions). Here, implementation of the state policies was more consistent with policymakers' intent, and the intermediate effects were more likely to meet both state and local expectations. In the case of mandates, consistency of problem definition seems to exert less influence on short-term implementation and effects. For example, the teacher testing policy in Georgia is fully implemented, and most state policymakers would argue that it is

achieving its intended effects. The fact that it is not entirely consistent with local districts' concern about recruiting and retaining black teachers has affected the ability of those districts to meet their goals, but not of the state to implement the policy.

Local context was found to be important in influencing implementation outcomes, but perhaps less so than past implementation studies had indicated. For both inducements and mandates, the amount of local discretion permitted by a particular policy appears to shape differences in implementation outcomes. For example, the effect of the market-sensitive salary in Georgia was strongly mitigated by the local salary-supplement policy, which made local fiscal capacity a strong determinant of a district's ability to attract and retain teachers. This contrasts with the more uniform effect of the master teacher program in Florida, where the state maintained control over design and implementation and allowed no local variation. Similarly, the testing mandate in Georgia has been little affected by local context, while the induction and CPD mandates in Pennsylvania may allow much greater variation, depending on how strictly the SDE enforces its requirement for a systematic focus on instructional strategies.

A final design feature found to be important is the ability of a policy to collect reliable and valid data on teacher performance without imposing high costs on principals and teachers. These transaction costs have been a continuing problem in all five states and a fairly serious one in Arizona, Florida, and Georgia. In fact, the demise of the master teacher program in Florida was largely due to the state's inability to collect good data on teacher performance without imposing high costs and adversely affecting morale. States are now seeking to address this problem by, for example, decentralizing data collection (e.g., in Florida's merit school program) or investing in more research and development, as Georgia agreed to do to improve its TCT system. Still, the inability to measure teacher performance reliably and to collect relevant data cost-efficiently remains one of the most serious problems associated with a broad range of teacher policies.

In fact, the greatest obstacle to balancing democratic control and professionalism may very well be the states' inability to resolve the questions of who should evaluate teachers and how they should be evaluated. This dilemma raises both technical and political issues. Section V describes the conditions that will have to be met if democratic control and teacher professionalism are to be more effectively balanced in future generations of teacher policy.

V. RESOLVING THE DILEMMA

NEW POLICY OPTIONS AND OLD VALUES

The teacher policies analyzed in this report are now characterized as the "first wave" of educational reform. As their shortcomings have become more evident, reform advocates have proposed a "second wave" of policies that will either enhance or substitute for the earlier ones. Many of these policies are intended to restructure the way schools are organized and governed. Although the term "restructuring" has multiple meanings and refers to a variety of options ranging from greater parental choice in schooling to increased teacher participation in educational decisionmaking (Olson, 1988), this second generation of policies tends to emphasize teacher professionalism—high entry standards established and implemented by the profession itself; greater teacher collegiality and autonomy within individual schools; and a differentiated staffing structure giving some teachers expanded leadership responsibilities (the most widely discussed of these proposals are those of the Carnegie Forum, 1986).

But even as policies to strengthen teacher professionalism are being proposed and debated, the tension between professionalism and democratic control persists. For example, policies to provide policymakers and the public with more statistical information about how schools are performing, and then to reward, punish, and assist schools based on that information have gained increased visibility over the past few years. The assumption behind this renewed emphasis on public accountability is that if information is available about how schools use the resources available to them, what courses they offer, who teaches them, and how well different types of students are learning, policymakers, educators, and the public will use that information to improve schooling (OERI State Accountability Study Group, 1988). This emphasis on accountability is not necessarily in conflict with notions of greater teacher professionalism. The National Governors' Association (1986), in fact, recommended an "old-fashioned horse trade" in which state governments would exert less regulation over local districts and schools, and in exchange, educators would produce better results for students. However, this exchange of greater local autonomy for better performance does assume that schools and teachers can be judged on publicly defined standards that are comparable over time and across schools in the same political jurisdiction. Hence, the need to

accommmodate both democratic control and professionalism continues for the second generation of reform proposals.

This final section describes the factors that will influence how policymakers attempt to resolve the dilemma of teacher policy and then suggests several strategies aimed at balancing democratic control and professionalism in future policies.

THE CONTINUING POLICY CONTEXT

In enacting and implementing new policies governing training, certification, and teaching conditions, policymakers must take into consideration three factors:

- The public wants a system of educational accountability that is standardized across schools, imposed at least partly from outside the educational establishment, and based on student and teacher performance.
- Arguments that strengthening teaching as a profession will attract and retain more qualified practitioners and will result in more appropriate education for individual students are viewed as legitimate and compelling. Despite the strength of these arguments, however, teachers themselves are not in agreement about what the elements of greater professionalism should be.
- Whether an accountability system is based on democratic control, professional norms, or both, difficult questions arise about who should be held accountable, for what, and to whom.

If state policymakers have heard one message loud and clear over the past six or seven years, it is that the public is concerned about the quality of the nation's public schools and is willing to pay to improve them, but that increased support requires greater accountability for performance. Both national and state-level poll data in the early 1980s documented these attitudes (McDonnell and Fuhrman, 1986). The public expectation of accountability taking a standardized form is evident from more recent national poll data. In the 1988 annual Gallup Poll of public attitudes towards the public schools, 81 percent of a nationally representative sample supported the concept of students taking national tests that would allow their educational achievement to be compared with that of students in other communities. Similarly, 86 percent of the respondents stated that experienced teachers should be periodically required to pass statewide basic competency tests in their subject areas (Gallup and Elam, 1988). This concern for greater public accountability and more standardized information about educational

performance mirrors a growing interest in holding all types of institutions publicly accountable for their performance. For example, because of public demands, the federal government now regularly reports mortality statistics for hospitals and the on-time departure records of the nation's airlines.

Although the constructive response of teachers and their unions to the reform movement has largely reversed the forces that prevented them from participating in the development of first-wave policies, state officials remain acutely aware that groups in addition to professional educators expect to have a voice in how schools operate and in defining the performance standards to which they are held accountable. The clearest evidence of that expectation is the extent to which educational reform and economic productivity have been joined. Much of the impetus for improving the quality of the nation's schools stems from a belief that better education is the only way to meet the skill needs of a changing economy. Policymakers recognize that business leaders, academics, and a variety of other groups must play an active role in defining and monitoring performance standards. For these reasons, then, the amount of control policymakers will be willing to delegate to the teaching profession itself is likely to be circumscribed.

The extent to which a consensus is emerging about the benefits of strengthening teacher professionalism is reflected in public opinion data, a variety of experiments supported by state and local governments, and unprecedented agreement among policymakers and teacher union leaders about which options to pursue. In the recent Gallup Poll, over 80 percent of the respondents supported the idea of establishing a national set of standards for teacher certification and increased pay for teachers who prove themselves particularly capable; and a majority supported the notion of clinical internships for prospective teachers (Gallup and Elam, 1988). Over the past few years, several states and local districts have begun to experiment with approaches that operationalize some of the recommendations of the Carnegie Forum and other restructuring proposals. For example, Maine, Massachusetts, and Washington are currently funding a variety of local initiatives to encourage school-site decisionmaking and to reorganize service delivery (Olson, 1988). A number of school districts are working collaboratively with local teacher unions to restructure teachers' work lives and enhance their professional responsibilities. Although it represents a dramatic change in some of their traditional positions, the AFT and NEA now support a national teacher certification process, a professional teacher board, forms of peer review, and a restructuring of schools to expand teacher authority and afford teachers a wider variety of roles within the school (for an analysis of this shift and why it

occurred, see McDonnell and Pascal, 1988). Both unions have also departed from their past espousal of a compensation system that treats all teachers alike and differentiates salaries only on seniority and educational attainment. They now support forms of compensation that, at least partly, distinguish among teachers on the basis of performance and the nature of their duties (Olson, 1989). This shift brings the national teacher unions much closer to the strategies espoused by many policymakers and considered desirable by public opinion.

Despite this convergence of opinion among policy elites, it is not clear that classroom teachers themselves support many of the strategies designed to strengthen teacher professionalism. Only a bare majority of teachers (52 percent) support the notion of specialty certification boards, as compared with 70 percent of teacher union leaders (Metropolitan Life, 1986). Although 97 percent of classroom teachers believe that teachers should have the major role in selecting texts, less than half believe that teachers should have the major role in peer review (31 percent), the selection of new principals (42 percent), or decisions about school-level budget allocations (39 percent) (Metropolitan Life, 1986). Some of these attitudes may shift over time as the socialization process for teachers changes and teachers observe how these innovations actually operate in practice. Nevertheless, a consensus about what aspects of teaching should be changed to create more professional conditions has by no means been achieved within the profession itself. Consequently, the task of balancing competing interests and concerns is further complicated.

Finally, whether accountability in teacher policy is premised on professionalism, popular-control norms, or a balance between the two, the design of the accountability system presents significant challenges. Behind the seemingly straightforward questions of who should be held accountable for what and to whom lie a variety of answers that have very different consequences for how schools are organized, for the quality of teachers' work lives, and for what students are taught. One could imagine a system that seeks to accommodate professionalism and democratic control by giving individual schools and faculties considerable discretion over how they use resources and deliver educational services, while at the same time meeting public accountability concerns by assessing the quality of student achievement on standardized criteria. In theory, such a system represents a limited delegation of authority from those constitutionally responsible for education to the teaching profession. However, it also raises a very serious question about the extent to which individual teachers, as compared with institutions, should be held accountable for student achievement. We know that student test scores (even when used in combination with other

indicators) are not valid proxies for individual teacher performance, given all the intervening factors—e.g., whether the test measures what teachers actually teach, the knowledge and skills students bring with them to the classroom, or whether a particular student is even in the teacher's classroom for the full year. On the other hand, standardized tests, if designed well and used correctly, can be an effective way of holding an institution such as an entire school and its faculty accountable. Determining the appropriate unit of accountability—state government, local districts, individual schools, administrators, entire faculties, individual teachers, or even students—for different aspects of educational performance is a challenge with profound consequences for the balance between professionalism and democratic control.

The question of whom teachers should be held accountable to also raises difficult issues. For example, the discussion thus far has assumed that the object of democratic control is the citizens of a given state through their elected officials, simply because state governments have constitutional responsibility for public education and because they have been the primary political actors in the educational reform movement of the 1980s. Alternatively, the long tradition in the United States of decentralized control in public education, with locally elected schools boards and locally generated revenue, might suggest that the school district should be the object of democratic control norms. Still others might argue that teachers should be held accountable to the local neighborhood or the parents of students attending a particular school. Certainly arguments can be marshalled to support or oppose the primacy of each level. For example, if one is concerned about questions of equal access to educational opportunities across different types of students and local communities, the state level appears most appropriate. On the other hand, state governments, by virtue of their distance from the classroom, must rely on much blunter policy strategies than individual schools or even local districts.

An illustration of the tradeoffs inherent in selecting different units of accountability is provided by one of the most widely discussed restructuring options—allowing parents to select which public school their child will attend (Elmore, 1986). This option appears to accomplish several objectives: It gives teachers the autonomy to construct a learning environment that embodies professional norms; at the same time, it implements public accountability through a modified market mechanism.[1] In other words, it seems to represent one resolution of the professionalism/democratic-control dilemma. But whether it is a viable solution or not depends on the unit of external accountability

[1]I am grateful to Arthur Wise for suggesting this argument.

desired. Schools of choice are likely to be very responsive to their own clients, but one could easily imagine a situation where expectations about curriculum and student outcomes are very different for a school's immediate clientele than they are for the broader electorate and its representatives (at either the state or local levels). In such a case, expanded parental choice would meet the test of responsiveness to clients, but not the requirements of democratic control.

Questions about the object of an accountability system also arise with regard to professional accountability. For example, those espousing greater professional control over teaching have not always been clear about the unit of accountability within the profession—will it be the teachers in a single school, a district, a state, or nationally who collectively enforce professional standards? When one considers the design of an accountability system that accommodates both professional and public concerns, the choices are further complicated.

This discussion is not meant to imply that the task of balancing democratic control and professionalism is impossible. Rather, it is to suggest that second-wave teacher policies are more likely to be successful if they are more sensitive to the constraints and opportunities afforded by the policy context than the first-wave policies were. Several policy strategies that take into consideration public expectations, the current state of teacher professionalism, and different approaches to accountability are outlined below.

NEXT STEPS

Concentrate on the Areas of Greatest Agreement

The first, and clearest, strategy for balancing the two approaches is to concentrate future policy efforts in the areas where those espousing democratic control and those advocating increased professionalism show the greatest agreement. The findings from this study and a variety of other sources strongly suggest that a widespread consensus exists in favor of teaching having higher entry standards. Although it is less strong and well-specified, a consensus is also growing around greater differentiation of teacher tasks and responsibilities in combination with some form of performance-based compensation—though not necessarily of the kind currently operating. Because teacher-opinion data show considerably less consensus about the form that increased teacher participation in school decisionmaking should take, and because the political and administrative feasibility of these options is largely unknown at this point, such policies should probably be accorded less immediate priority and should continue as diverse, small-scale experiments.

Focusing on more rigorous entry standards raises two questions related to professionalism and democratic control:

- Can standards be developed that validly measure the attributes of a competent teacher as defined by professional norms, but that are also viewed as legitimate by policymakers and the general public?
- Who will define and implement those standards?

The first question can be answered with a conditional "yes." After studying the question of teacher licensure in considerable depth, Wise, Darling-Hammond, and their colleagues (1987) concluded that within the existing state of measurement technology, it is possible to develop a test of teaching skills that can assess whether a novice teacher is fit for professional practice. However, they argue that the test must include a variety of written tasks (e.g., preparing a lesson plan, grading a student assignment, and devising appropriate instructional strategies as follow-up) and oral ones (e.g., delivering a short lecture on a specified subject, observing student performance on videotape and then describing how the student might be counseled). Such a test is very different from states' current reliance on instruments that assess teachers' subject-matter knowledge (usually with multiple-choice questions) or that test their recall of discrete teaching behaviors. With a more comprehensive set of indicators, prospective teachers can be tested on whether they are able to analyze different teaching situations and construct effective responses to them. Wise and Darling-Hammond also place this test of teaching skills in a larger training and licensure system, where certification requires a liberal education with an academic major and an initial test of academic and subject-matter skills, followed by a supervised internship. This approach or some variation of it would require several years of test development and validation studies and would cost more than states currently spend on licensing teachers (Wise and Darling-Hammond estimate $3500 per supervised internship and $3.8 to $4.7 million for test development). Still, it would have the distinct advantage of meeting the most basic tenet of professionalism—rigorous entry standards. Because of its comprehensiveness and similarity to the licensure procedures used in other professions such as law and medicine, this approach would also be likely to meet public performance expectations.

However, because teaching is primarily a public sector endeavor and for all the reasons outlined in this report, it is unlikely that defining and implementing entry standards will ever be left entirely to professional control. Therefore, the governance of teacher entry is another

arena where professionalism and democratic control must be balanced. On the one hand, there is no dispute about the governmental level that should have responsibility for teacher licensure. Professional licensure of all types has historically been a prerogative of state governments, and even those who advocate a national board of professional teaching standards view such an entity as focusing on developing advanced standards for experienced teachers and making its certification process voluntary. But the proper vehicle for implementing state-level control of the teacher entry process remains a topic of debate. Currently, the teacher certification process[2] in most states is administered through the state education agency. The NEA and some teacher reform advocates have argued for establishing state-level professional standards boards, the majority of whose members would be practicing teachers (Rodman, 1987; Wise, 1989). These boards would be accountable to the governor and the legislature, but would be independent of other state agencies and would be responsible for establishing and implementing entry standards. Although staff with technical expertise would develop the actual assessment instruments, the board members would be responsible for defining the broad skill areas to be tested and the standard of mastery candidates would need to meet. Currently, six states—Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and West Virginia—have variants of such boards.

An interest in balancing democratic control and professionalism would suggest a model of governance that would give the teaching profession greater control over entry than it currently has in most states, but less than it would have with majority membership on a state standards board. This alternative model would make practicing teachers the largest group represented on a state board, but not the majority. It would take into consideration the fact that other groups such as elected officials, parents, school administrators, employers, and the general public have a stake in how teacher qualifications are defined and

[2]Those advocating greater teacher professionalism typically make a distinction between the current practice of states *certifying* teacher candidates and a process of *licensing* them as fit to work independently as professionals. The current certification process is viewed as simply attesting that a candidate has completed an approved program of teacher education, although some minimal testing may be involved (Wise, 1989). Licensing, on the other hand, is the granting of permission to hold a certain status or do a certain thing by a constitutional authority.

This distinction breaks down somewhat in the case of teaching, because the proposed National Board for Teaching Standards, which will test experienced teachers on an advanced standard, also talks of "certify[ing] teachers who meet that standard" (Carnegie Forum, 1986). It makes a quite different distinction between licensure and certification, arguing that the state issues a license indicating that a candidate meets minimum standards. Certification, on the other hand, "means that the profession itself pronounces the certificate holder fully competent to perform at a high professional standard" (Carnegie Forum, 1986: 65).

monitored. Therefore, each of these groups (or some different combination, depending on the political dynamics of a particular state) would be represented on the board and together would constitute a majority. However, teachers would retain their position as the largest single voice.

In the case of entry standards, then, democratic control and professionalism could be more equally balanced if the testing process measured candidates on a set of generic skills (as opposed to discrete behaviors) that meet the professional criterion of expert knowledge, but that are also understandable and credible to the public. Who defines those standards and how they are implemented are as important as their content if democratic control and professional norms are to be balanced. Who should be represented on the governing body, what the proportion should be, and what should fall within the scope of their responsibilities are all tough political questions. Nevertheless, the strong consensus that rigorous entry standards are critical to improving the quality of teaching means that the payoff for policymakers willing to move in this area is likely be immediate and significant.

A second area of growing consensus concerns the notion of a differentiated task structure in teaching and performance-based compensation. The analysis of first-wave reforms presented in this report suggests three clear implications for future policy in this area: First, a system of performance-based compensation needs to be premised not only on different skill levels (however defined), but also on greater or different responsibilities. Earlier policies such as the career ladder in Arizona and the master teacher program in Florida failed to outline what was expected of teachers once they reached their new status, and this resulted in confusion among participants and resentment among other teachers. Even the mentor teacher program in California, which stresses additional responsibilities, generally failed to define them in ways that contribute to the collective enterprise rather than just to the development of the individual mentors.

The experience of these earlier policies demonstrates the importance of minimizing the competitive dimensions of performance-based compensation and maximizing the collaborative and supportive aspects. Any system that makes distinctions in status or monetary benefits will engender some competitive feelings. But negative consequences can be minimized if the participants believe that additional compensation is for extra work, that not everyone can or wants to perform the same duties, and that any individual teacher is better off with this system because it provides her or him with the support and expertise needed to do her or his own job more effectively.

A second lesson from the earlier policies is that although state governments can set broad parameters—compensation levels, the nature of teacher responsibilities, and general performance standards—they cannot be the direct implementers of a performance-based compensation system. Because no state agency has the capacity to evaluate practicing teachers on anything but the most superficial basis, that function must be delegated to entities closer to local schools and classrooms. The question for the design of future policy is to whom that authority should be delegated: to local districts, individual schools, independent committees of teachers, teacher training institutions, community or parent leaders, or some combination of these?

The final lesson is one that has been referred to throughout this report: The legitimacy of any teacher compensation system—in both the public's and the profession's eyes—rests on the quality of the evaluation system. If the evaluation system cannot collect fair and reliable data about teacher performance without incurring high transaction costs, neither professionalism nor democratic control will be served.

The first two lessons have been accepted by most policymakers, and future versions of teacher compensation policies will probably look quite different from the ones enacted in the early 1980s. The third lesson, however, will be much more difficult to act on. At one level, it presents significant technical challenges. The experience of the five states in our study sample indicates the tradeoffs inherent in designing an evaluation system that is fair and can generate sufficiently uniform information to meet the due-process requirements associated with promotion decisions. The states and school systems in our sample that attempted to implement evaluation systems either had to bear high transaction costs or they inappropriately used assessment procedures designed for other purposes. Research on teacher evaluation systems concludes that a single evaluation process cannot simultaneously perform multiple functions such as assessing beginning teachers for tenure decisions, classifying experienced teachers for promotion, and aiding teachers who are experiencing difficulties in the classroom (Wise et al., 1984). Consequently, states and local districts planning to implement performance-based compensation systems will need to devote considerable development resources to designing an evaluation process that is specific to a particular purpose and that avoids the technical pitfalls of past models.

Most of the recent proposals for improving teacher evaluation systems include the strong recommendation that the systems be based, either wholly or partly, on peer review (e.g., Darling-Hammond, 1986). Not only is peer review central to professionalism, according to these

arguments, but it can also result in more valid information about performance because skilled teachers will be more sensitive to the nuances of instructional strategies than evaluators whose expertise may lie further from the day-to-day functioning of individual classrooms. Yet, as indicated previously, less than one-third of the classroom teachers support the concept of teachers having the major role in evaluating other teachers (Metropolitan Life, 1986). The reasons for this attitude are varied and probably even idiosyncratic to different teachers—e.g., unfamiliarity with how the process would work, a desire to maintain traditional distinctions between the functions of school management and classroom teachers, strong egalitarian norms. Nevertheless, until teachers themselves accept the concept of peer review, the task of developing better teacher evaluation systems will be more than a technical one—it will also represent a political challenge.

As a result, it will be more difficult to make progress in balancing democratic control and professionalism in performance-based compensation than in entry standards. But with 25 states currently using some type of incentive pay program for teachers and over 80 percent of the American public favoring an increased pay scale for teachers who have proved themselves particularly capable, improving the basis on which teachers are compensated is a task that policymakers cannot afford to overlook.

Task differentiation within teaching is another area where the level of consensus among teachers, parents, school administrators, policymakers, and the general public is considerably lower than it is for either entry standards or compensation systems. Task differentiation involves reorganizing schools to give teachers more control over how resources are allocated and how instruction is delivered to students. At a general level, the public and business leaders support the notion that if teachers are to be held accountable for student progress, they should have a say in what is taught and how school budgets are spent (Harris, 1986). However, the consensus breaks down with regard to the specifics of translating that notion into practice. Policymakers have little information about the costs of such a strategy or its implications for the distribution of fiscal and programmatic responsibility across governmental levels; parents and school administrators question what their roles will be in the restructured school; and even teachers themselves remain divided in their preferences for new roles and responsibilities (Metropolitan Life, 1986; McDonnell and Pascal, 1988). Therefore, it seems that this is not currently a fruitful area for any type of large-scale policy change. Rather, states and local districts should consider continuing and expanding current efforts to encourage school-level experimentation. Over the next few years, experience will

demonstrate the relative strengths and weaknesses of these different approaches. Then, state policymakers will most likely have to intervene to ensure that larger issues of democratic control—e.g., that school-site autonomy does not result in service inequities across schools, that the interests of groups, in addition to teachers, are served within the public schools—are not lost in the efforts to strengthen professionalism.

Expand the Range of Policy Instruments

Policymakers should also consider a broader range of instruments in designing future teacher policies. The first-wave policies were based on a rather narrow range of policy instruments. Mandates were used, as one would expect, to ensure that minimum standards would be met (e.g., testing for initial certification). Then when states viewed the policy problem as the need to stimulate teacher performance beyond some specified minimum, states used a variety of inducements.

The experience of Arizona and Californiad indicates that the number and type of regulatory strings attached to even a policy of inducements can influence the balance between democratic control and professionalism. For example, if policymakers are particularly interested in maximizing democratic control, they might choose an inducement with strict regulations governing its use. This approach requires the availability of an instrument that can collect reliable and valid information about performance. If such an instrument is unavailable, democratic-control values could be perverted by teachers narrowing their behavior to conform with the assessment instrument in ways that are detrimental to effective student instruction. This approach, then, requires a high degree of technical capacity (e.g., as needed for the Arizona career ladder, with its requirement to link student achievement and teacher performance). On the other hand, policymakers might decide to use an inducement with few regulatory "strings" (e.g., the mentor teacher program in California) in an attempt to motivate greater professionalism. This approach requires that local problem definition and priorities be relatively consistent with those of the state. If they are not, democratic-control values may be compromised because the policy either is not implemented or is implemented in ways that diverge from the public's and policymakers' expectations (e.g., if the program is used as a local pork barrel, with benefits allocated broadly and with little regard for merit or educational benefit). Thus, even for inducement programs, the balance between democratic control and professionalism can be adjusted by the initial policy design.

However, policymakers need to consider expanding the range of instruments beyond just mandates and inducements. The political reasons for not using either capacity-building or system-changing instruments are understandable: the payoff from the former is long-term and uncertain, and the latter tends to be controversial because it upsets the existing balance of organizational authority. Still, relying primarily on mandates and inducements assumes that schools and individual teachers already have the capacity to change their behavior and simply lack sufficient incentives.

One finding from this analysis of recent teacher policies is particularly clear: Insufficient capacity is a primary reason for the failure of these policies to work as intended. State agencies, local districts, schools, and individual teachers currently lack the tools to ensure professional-level entry standards, to evaluate practicing teachers fairly and validly, or to reorganize teachers' responsibilities in more meaningful ways. If professionalism is to be strengthened without sacrificing democratic-control norms, states will have to invest in a variety of capacity-building instruments that have been largely ignored in recent years. These include better measures of teacher performance (for both new and experienced teachers) and, equally important, professional development to enable teachers to engage in constructive peer review and work collaboratively with fellow professionals. A detailed discussion of teacher staff development needs is beyond the scope of this report, but this activity is key to any teaching reform, and providing more effective staff development depends not so much on more resources being spent as on their being spent more productively.

System-changing instruments are designed to alter organizational norms and structures because existing ones have become inefficient or unresponsive. For example, state-level professional standards boards would shift responsibility for teacher licensing from state departments of education to independent boards in the expectation that the boards would more effectively advance professional norms as well as the larger public interest. As the discussion in an earlier section suggests, policymakers interested in raising entry standards for teaching will have to consider not only the content of those standards, but also the structure of the institution defining and monitoring them.

These are just a few examples of how policymakers can address problems beyond those of insufficient incentives. Most capacity-building and system-changing teacher policies are not meant to be used alone or even as the lead instrument in combination with others. Rather, capacity-building instruments provide the infrastructure of resources and expertise that makes mandates such as teacher testing or inducements such as differential compensation work as intended.

Similarly, a professional standards board merely provides the vehicle to balance professional and public interests in the implementation of other teacher policies.

Address the Bureaucracy Problem

An implementing mechanism such as a professional standards board suggests a final strategy that the designers of future teacher policies need to consider. Whether those policies favor professionalism or democratic-control norms or are able to balance the two, they will be implemented through some type of bureaucracy. Given that some large states have over 100,000 teachers and that even moderate-sized school districts employ several thousand teachers each, no teacher policy can be implemented except through an organization with a systematic division of labor, uniform rules of procedure, and some element of hierarchy. Even if policymakers were to delegate complete control of teaching to the profession itself, the sheer size and complexity of the enterprise would require some type of bureaucratic organization.

As discussed in Sec. II, those advocating greater professionalism and those seeking to promote democratic control both view bureaucracy as a potential threat to fulfilling their objectives, and each side tends to blame the other for the growth of bureaucracy. This is particularly true of those advocating greater teacher professionalism. In their view, the governance of teaching through public policy is synonymous with bureaucratic control, which they contrast with professional control and define as its opposite.

Such a distinction confuses means and ends. This report argues that democratic control and professionalism are both legitimate values (or ends) that American society esteems and that teacher policy should seek to promote. Bureaucracy, on the other hand, is the *means* that must be used in a complex world to implement policies advancing either or both of those goals. Therefore, the challenge for future teacher policy is not to eliminate bureaucracy, but to shape its structure and activities so that it is accountable both to the teaching profession and to the public. This challenge is, of course, more easily proposed than met. One of the most difficult, continuing responsibilities of democratic government is that of holding its institutions accountable to those they serve. This task will never be fully accomplished. But in the case of teacher policy, an acknowledgment that democratic control and professionalism are both legitimate goals that can be balanced through careful policy design and implementation is a critical first step.

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